FY2025 Handbook MCC Indicators

Version 1.0
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JEFFERSON WATERMAN INTERNATIONAL

ENDSIGHT CONSULTING
Where Outcomes Come First

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Summary Note

This Handbook of priority MCC indicators provides the data and recommendations necessary to improve country performance on the MCC Scorecard. It includes all formulas, calculations, target scores, and rating agencies.

- This Handbook is for the FY2025 Country Scorecard released by MCC in November 2024 and data are derived directly from the various rating agencies.
- Cote d'Ivoire ($2670 GNI per capita) competes as a Lower-Middle Income Country ($2146 - $4465) where qualifying standards are higher than for Low Income Countries (< $2146).

The Handbook identifies key areas for policy **reforms** and operational improvement by the government. It also provides guidance for gathering national data and transmitting credible **data** to rating agencies.

__Cote d'Ivoire must regain momentum implementing specific policy reforms directed from the Prime Minister in addition to its work collecting data.__

Côte d'Ivoire FY25

Population   28,873,000
GNI/Cap $2,670
Category   GNI/Cap $2,166 - $4,515

Half Scorecard Passed ✓
Control of Corruption ✓
Democratic Rights ✓

Economic Freedom

Fiscal Policy
33%   Score -5.6
Median -4.1

IMF WEO

Inflation
4.4 Score   Rank 73%
Max 15.0

IMF WEO

Regulatory Quality
85%   Score 0.45
Median 0.00

World Bank/Brookings WGI

Trade Policy
70%   Score 70.0
Median 66.2

Heritage Foundation

Gender in the Economy
100%   Score 95.6
Median 73.1

World Bank/WORLD Policy Analysis Center

Land Rights and Access
29%   Score 0.371
Median 0.479

V-Dem/IFAD

Access to Credit
26%   Score 0.302
Median 0.499

IMF/Findex

Employment Opportunity
93%   Score 0.718
Median 0.428

V-Dem/WORLD Policy Analysis Center

For more information regarding the Millennium Challenge Account Selection Process and these indicators, please consult MCC's website www.mcc.gov/selection

Ruling Justly

Political Rights
19 Score   Rank 44%
Min 17

Freedom House

Civil Liberties
30 Score   Rank 44%
Min 25

Freedom House

Control of Corruption
63%   Score 0.09
Median 0.00

World Bank/Brookings WGI

Government Effectiveness
44%   Score -0.07
Median 0.00

World Bank/Brookings WGI

Rule of Law
41%   Score -0.24
Median 0.00

World Bank/Brookings WGI

Freedom of Information
86%   Score 70.9
Median 42.2

RSF/Access Now/CLD

Investing in People

Health Expenditures
7%   Score 1.03
Median 2.28

WHO

Education Expenditures
31%   Score 3.43
Median 4.12

UNESCO

Natural Resource Protection
85%   Score 50.2
Median 36.5

Yale/CIESIN

Immunization Rates
26%   Score 74.5
Median 85.0

WHO/UNICEF

Girls' Lower Sec Edu Completion Rate
0%   Score 30.0
Median 85.4

UNESCO

Child Health
7%   Score 61.9
Median 89.6

CIESIN/YCELP

Priority Order for 2025

Priority	Indicator	FY24	FY25	Comment
	Turn Green Now			
1	Government Effectiveness	56%	44%	Now failing; other countries moving faster; close to median
2	Rule of Law	47%	41%	Other countries improving faster; close to median
	Move Toward Median			
3	Land Rights and Access	38%	29%	IFAD follow up; focus new work on V-Dem
4	Access to Credit	31%	26%	Engage FINDEX
5	Education Expenditures	38%	31%	Budget issue
6	Fiscal Policy	47%	33%	Budget issue; forecast to improve but stay red 2-3 years
7	Political Rights	19pts	19pts	Push to make safely green > 22 pts.
8	Control of Corruption	59%	63%	Push to make safely green > 65%
	Get Out From the Bottom			
9	Immunization Rates	19%	26%	Improve program implementation
10	Girls' Sec Edu Completion	0%	0%	Worst among any LMIC; need Presidential Initiative
11	Health Expenditures	16%	7%	Focus on national health insurance data
12	Child Health	3%	7%	Need a single official to take responsibility
	Safely Green			

Civil Liberties (30 pts; min. 26 pts)	Employment Opportunity (93%)
Regulatory Quality (85%)	Natural Resources (85%)
Trade Policy (70%)	Freedom Information (86%)
Gender in Economy (100%)	Inflation (4.4, max 15.0)

Indicator Data Collection and Timeline

INDICATOR	Rating Agency (WGT)	Contact	CALENDAR
	WORLD BANK / WORLD GOVERNANCE INDICATORS Compiles data from sub-indicators	wgi@worldbank.org +1 (202) 473-4557 Aart Kraay akraay@worldbank.org +1(202) 473-5757 Christian Gonzalez cgonzalez@worldbank.org	World Bank / WGI Collects from subindicators: February – July Compiles data: August – September Publishes: October
Control of Corruption	World Justice Project (Washington DC)	Betsy Anderson (202) 407-9320 eandersen@worldjusticeproject.org Renae Ford (202) 407-9322 rford@worldjusticeproject.org Alicia Evangelines (NY) Alejandro Ponce aponce@worldjusticeproject.org wjp@worldjusticeproject.org	Data collection: October – May Data analysis: June – September Publish: October (probably too late for MCC cycle; possible N-2 lag)
	Political Risk Services	Christopher McKee (CEO) (571) 595 5402 cmckee@prsgroup.com Louis Carroll +1 (315) 431-0511 lcarroll@prsgroup.com	Publishes Quarterly Updates Paid subscription
	Economic Intelligence Unit – EIU (London)	colemanjohnson@eiu.com Deborah Moore, dm@eiu.com Michael Schaeffer michaelschaeffer@eiu.com Adrian Goldfinch adriangoldfinch@eiu.com	To Be Determined – Need to Subscribe
	Now S&P Global (London / Johannesburg) (Formerly IHS Markit World Economic Service (WMO)	Thea Fourie Thea.fouri@spglobal.com Karim Elassir Karim.elassire@spglobal.com Alex Poole-Warren Alex.poole-warren@spglobal.com	To Be Determined - Need to Subscribe

		These contacts are in the Johanessburg office.	
	Int'l Fund for Agricultural Dev (IFAD)	See Land Rights and Access	See Land Rights and Access
	Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Germany)	Sabine Donner sabine.donner@bertelsmann.de Hauke Hartmann (Senior Experts) bti@bertelsmann-stiftung.de (5241)81-81501 yannik.john@bertelsmann-stiftung.de	Bi-annual Report NOV-JAN data collection by experts (one local + one int'l) JAN 31 data due JAN + 1 year publish Provide WB finished data during summer.
	WB - Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) (Washington DC)	Christian Gonzalez cgonzalez@worldbank.org	To Be Determined
	Varieties of Democracy Institute V-Dem)	Professor Staffan I. Lindberg (Director, V-Dem Institute, Dept. of Political Science, Univ. of Gothenburg) / Director, DEMSCORE (National Research Infrastructure) sil@v-dem.net Evie Papada evie.papada@v-dem.net josefine.pernes@v-dem.net	SEP-DEC: Preparation for coding with experts JAN: Survey sent, coding performed by experts FEB: V-Dem receives coding from experts MAR: V-Dem publishes report
	Institutional Profiles dB - IPD) (Paris)	Astrid Tricaud Astrid.TRICAUD@dgtresor.gouv.fr	
	GCS (World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey) (Geneva)	Roberto Crotti roberto.crotti@weforum.org Collins Aengus aengus.collins@weforum.org	
	African Development Bank (ADB)	Riadh is temporary replacement for Oscar R.BENMESSAOUD@AFDB.ORG	
	Africa Integrity Indicators (ex GII)	Jiya Alex, Alex.jiya@afidep.org Ndlovu Mziwandile, Mziwandile.ndlovu@afidep.org	NOTE: In late-2022, Global Integrity

			shifted its data collection to AFIDEP located in Nairobi
		Yombo Arnaud, Arnaud.yombo@afidep.org	
	Global Corruption Barometer (Canada)	Jon Vrushi jvrushi@transparency.org Roberto Kukutschka rkukutschka@transparency.org	
Governement Effectiveness	EIU	See Control of Corruption	See Control of Corruption
	HIS Markit World Economic Service (WMO) S&P		
	Africa Integrity Indicators (ex GII)		
	World Bank (Policy and Institutional Assessment)		
	African Development Bank (ADB)		
	Political Risk Services		
	IPD (Institutional Profiles Database)		
	GCS (World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey)		
	Bertelsmann Transformation Index		
	Open Budget Initiative (OBI) (Washington DC)	Anjali Garg, agarg@internationalbudget.org (202) 408 1080	
	Int'l Fund for Agricultural Dev (IFAD)	See Land Rights and Access	
	Brookings Institution	daniel@kaufmanndata.net	
Rule of Law	EIU	See Control of Corruption	See Control of Corruption
	World Bank (Policy and Institutional Assessment)		
	African Development Bank (ADB)		
	World Justice Project		
	IPD (Institutional Profiles Database)		

	HIS Markit World Economic Service (WMO) S&P		
	GCS (World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey)		
	Bertelsmann Transformation Index		
	Political Risk Services		
	Varieties of Dem / V-Dem)		
	Int'l Fund for Ag Dev (IFAD)		
Political Rights	Freedom House	Colby Pacheco (DC, Lead Africa programs) pacheco@freedomhouse.org Amy Slipowitz (NY, Lead Freedom in World) slipowitz@freedomhouse.org info@freedomhouse.org +1 (212) 514-8040	Activity Period: January 1 - December 31 Collection: January - March Publish: March-May
Immunization Rates	WHO	Carolina Danovaro danovaroc@who.int TOURE Hapsatou toureh@who.int +41 79 506 6528	JAN 1 – DEC 31: reporting period End MAR: Receive data from MOH (also monthly) MAY 15: WHO sends evaluated data to MOH End JUN: Country comments JUL 15: WHO Publish final
	UNICEF Center for	Marie-Pierre Poirier (West / Central reg. dir.)	
	International Earth Science	adesherbinin@ciesin.columbia.edu ktschirh@ciesin.columbia.edu	
Girls' Secondary Education Completion	UNESCO/UIS	survey@uis.unesco.org +1 (514) 343-7752 Nutan Wozencroft n.wozencroft@unesco.org	Activity Period: January 1 - December

		Olga o.ovsyannikova@unesco.org Isaias Barreto ib.rosa@unesco.org UNESCO institute for statistics: uis.survey@unesco.org Olivier Labé : o.labe@unesco.org Patrick Montjourides : p.montjourides@unesco.org	31 Collection: January - March Publish: April To Be Confirmed
Child Health	Columbia/Yale (YCELP)	See Natural Resources	Primarily natural resources, not Child Health
	CIESIN (Columbia)	Alex de Sherbinin adesherbinin@ciesin.columbia.edu 845-365-8936 Dr. Robert Chen (Dir Program) bchen@ciesin.columbia.edu +1 (845 365 8952 ciesin.info@ciesin.columbia.edu +1 (845) 365-8988	Sanitation / Water (UN JMP (WHO / Unicef) JUN – AUG: Collect (two yrs.) JUL – AUG: Publish: Child Mortality (UN Pop. Division - NY) - TBD
Access to Credit	IMF	Financial Development Index (IMF) MOmoev@imf.org RIyer@imf.org	
	World Bank / FINDEX	FINDEX reports Number of Accounts (age 15+) lklapper@worldbank.org	Data collection every three years: 2011, 2014, 2017, 2021 (covid) Collection: Fall (individual surveys via Gallup) Publish: Early Spring
Employment Opportunity		1. UCLA's WORLD Policy Analysis Center's data on Disability Rights and Employment Discrimination. https://www.worldpolicycenter.org/. Gonzalo Moreno gmoreno@ph.ucla.edu	

		2. 2. V-Dem data on Civil Society Organization Start-Up and Shutdown and forced labor for men and women. contact@v-dem.net. See Control of Corruption	
Education Expenditures	UNESCO	Nutan Wozencroft n.wozencroft@unesco.org Olga o.ovsyannikova@unesco.org Isaias Barreto ib.rosa@unesco.org survey@uis.unesco.org +1 (514) 343-7752	UNESCO surveys to countries Jan – Feb Return data Mar – Jun Publish 3x Feb, June, Nov (MCC likely uses the June data) - Confirm w UNESCO/KIN
Health Expenditures	World Health Organisation	See Immunization	JAN - JUN: Collection JUN - AUG: Assess country data and credibility DEC: Publish final *Internal update each APR; countries may updates by late MAR for interim report.
Land Rights and Access	International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD)	Mr. Messan, IFAD's Country Representative f.messan@ifad.org Ms. Sarrasoro, IFAD Country Program Coordinator o.sarassoro@ifad.org Kouakou Kouame, k.kouakou@ifad.org Sana Jatta s.jatta@ifad.org (+39) 349 695 1100	IFAD performs updates of countries every few years, depending on attention and funding. Usually IFAD will publish in October, but it is less regular than other indicators.
	Varieties of Democracy Institute V-Dem)	Burmeister Susanna Director, V-Dem Institute, Dept. of Political Science, Univ. of Gothenburg / Director, DEMSCORE (National Research Infrastructure)	V-Dem says they don't collect land rights information.

		Also, see Control of Corruption	
Fiscal Policy	IMF/WEO	Sampawende J.-A. Tapsoba stapsoba@imf.org Kadima Kalonji RR-CIV@imf.org +225 (20) 300 165	IMF updates data in April and October
Civil Liberties	Freedom House	See Political Rights	See Political Rights
Regulatory Quality	EIU	See Control of Corruption	See Control of Corruption
	HIS Markit World Economic Service (WMO)		
	World Bank (Policy and Institutional Assessment)		
	African Development Bank (ADB)		
	Political Risk Services		
	Bertelsmann Transformation Index		
	Int'l Fund for Ag Dev (IFAD)	See Land Rights and Access	
	World Justice Project	See Control of Corruption	
	GCS (World Economic Forum Executive Opinion Survey)	See Government Effectiveness	
	The Heritage Foundation	See Trade Policy	
Freedom of Information	Reporters Without Borders	Arnaud Froger (Responsable du bureau Afrique) afrique@rsf.org Laetitia Chesseron lchesseron@rsf.org Diana Guzman (International coordinator) dguzman@rsf.org	RSF - To be determined
	Centre for Law and Democracy	Toby Mendel toby@law-democracy.org +1(902) 431-3688	Focused on FOIA processes and openness of government data. Data collection and publishing on ongoing in real time.
	Access Now	Peter Micek peter@accessnow.org +1(888) 414-0100 Jonathan Rozen Committee to Protect Jouranlists jrozen@cpj.org +1 (917) 370 1030	Focused on harassment and jailing of journalists

			on a per incident basis.
Trade Policy	The Heritage Foundation	Anthony Kim Anthony.Kim@heritage.org +1 (202) 608-6261	AUG – SEP: Collection OCT: Last input and Publish:
Natural Resource Protection	CIESIN/YCELP	Yale: Sebastian ycelp@yale.edu CIESIN: See Child Health	<u>CIESIN</u> Collection: February - March Publish: July - August <u>YALE</u> Activity period: January 1 - December 31 Collection: Before February Publishes every 2 years; next May-June 2024
Gender in the Economy	World Bank / Women Business and the Law (WBL)	ttrumbic@worldbank.org ptavares@worldbank.org melefante@worldbank.org ttrumbic@worldbank.org	Collection: Begin April Last input: October 1 Publish: March
Inflation	IMF/WEO	Kadima Kalonji RR-CIV@imf.org +225 (20) 300 165	IMF updates data in April and October

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Government Effectiveness

</td><td>**Priority: Very High #1 of 20**</td></tr>
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Country	Raw WGI FY25
Bhutan	0,566
Samoa	0,493
India	0,475
Jordan	0,386
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	0,232
Philippines	0,154
Viet Nam	0,126
Cape Verde	0,014
Morocco	-0,036
Ghana	-0,093
Kiribati	-0,097
Egypt, Arab Rep.	-0,240
Sri Lanka	-0,252
Uzbekistan	-0,284
Tunisia	-0,301
Côte d'Ivoire	**-0,360**
Vanuatu	-0,569
Bolivia	-0,639
Bangladesh	-0,697
Djibouti	-0,731
Solomon Islands	-0,734
Honduras	-0,795
Papua New Guinea	-0,802
Eswatini	-0,885
São Tomé and Principe	-0,902
Nicaragua	-1,085
Congo, Rep.	-1,334
Lebanon	-1,580

Minister of Responsibility:
M. JEAN SANSAN KAMBILE Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice et des Droits de l'Homme
M. ADAMA COULIBALY, Ministre des Finances et du Budget
MME ANNE DESIREE OULOTO, Ministre de la Fonction Publique et de la Modernisation de l'Administration
Focal Point: Jean- Yves MELESS
Sambro N'GUESSAN Eugene
KOUAME Yao N'Guettia/ KOUAME Bah Désire

Indicator Institutions:
WGI / various

	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(-1.5 — 1.5) **-0.07** MEDIAN = 0.00	(0 – 100) **44%**
TARGET	**0.28**	**68%**

BOTTOM LINE

Cote d'Ivoire fell from passing to failing because it did not make improvements while other countries increased their scores.

This indicator overlaps other indicators, particularly Control of Corruption.

The score is very close to the median and can move from failing to passing this year if a strong effort is made.
  1) *Simplify government bureaucracy and remove burdensome processes.*
  2) *Reinforce merit-based policies in the civil service.*
  3) *Improve oversight and auditing of government budgets and operations.*

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

1. **Implement the anti-corruption strategy and increase digitization of government operations (see the Control of Corruption indicator strategy).**
2. **Implement government employment policies that reward merit and performance in the workplace and removes patronage.**
3. **Increase the oversight and audit of public funds, budgets, and state-owned companies.**
4. **Strengthen legislative oversight of the executive.**
5. **Strengthen ONS to produce independent and credible statistics, especially on public welfare.**

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to its stated policies.

Countries are evaluated on the following factors:

- competence of civil service; effective implementation of government decisions; and public service vulnerability to political pressure;
- ability to manage political changes without drastic policy changes or interruptions in government services;
- flexibility, learning, and innovation within the political leadership; ability to coordinate conflicting objectives into coherent policies;
- the efficiency of revenue mobilization and budget management;
- the quality of transportation infrastructure, telecommunications, electricity supply, public health care provision, and public schools; the availability of online government services;
- policy consistency; the extent to which government commitments are honored by new governments;
- prevalence of red tape; the degree to which bureaucratic delays hinder business activity;
- existence of a taxpayer service and information program, and an efficient and effective appeals mechanism;
- the extent to which:
  - effective coordination mechanisms ensure policy consistency across departmental boundaries, and administrative structures are organized along functional lines with little duplication;
  - the business processes of government agencies are regularly reviewed to ensure efficiency of decision making and implementation;
  - political leadership sets and maintains strategic priorities and the government effectively implements reforms;
  - hiring and promotion within the government is based on merit and performance, and ethical standards prevail;
  - the government wage bill is sustainable and does not crowd out spending required for public services; pay and benefit levels do not deter talented people from

entering the public sector; flexibility (that is not abused) exists to pay more attractive wages in hard-to-fill positions;

- o government revenues are generated by low-distortion taxes; import tariffs are low and relatively uniform, export rebate or duty drawbacks are functional; the tax base is broad and free of arbitrary exemptions; tax administration is effective and rule-based; and tax administration and compliance costs are low;
- o policies and priorities are linked to the budget; multi-year expenditure projections are integrated into the budget formulation process, and reflect explicit costing of the implications of new policy initiatives; the budget is formulated through systematic consultations with spending ministries and the legislature, adhering to a fixed budget calendar; the budget classification system is comprehensive and consistent with international standards; and off-budget expenditures are kept to a minimum and handled transparently;
- o the budget is implemented as planned, and actual expenditures deviate only slightly from planned levels;
- o budget monitoring occurs throughout the year based on well-functioning management information systems; reconciliation of banking and fiscal records is practiced comprehensively, properly, and in a timely way;
- o in-year fiscal reports and public accounts are prepared promptly and regularly and provide full and accurate data; the extent to which accounts are audited in a timely, professional and comprehensive manner, and appropriate action is taken on budget reports and audit findings.

Mathematical Formula of the Indicator

The database of the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI) contains the sources and calculations:

Country data by source
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports
1. Go to Interactive Data access
2. Go to Country Data View

Weights by source
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents
3. Go to the link on Step 3 of the WGI Aggregated Methodology

Surveys used
4. Go to Documentation → WGI Aggregation Methodology
5. Go to Step 2, data files link

MCC Methodology

MCC Normalized Score = WGI Score - median score

MCC adjusts the median for each of the two scorecard income pools to zero for each of the four WGI indicators. Country scores are calculated by taking the difference between raw scores and the median. For example, in FY24 the unadjusted median for LMIC countries on Control of Corruption was -0.54. To set the median at zero, MCC simply adds 0.54 to each country's score (the same thing as subtracting a negative 0.54). Therefore, as an example, Algeria's FY24 Control of Corruption score, which was originally -0.64, was adjusted to -0.10.

The FY25 scores come from the 2024 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset and largely reflect performance in calendar year 2023. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are updated annually. Each year, the World Bank and Brookings Institution also make minor backward revisions to the historical data. Prior to 2006, the World Bank released data every two years (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004).

Calculation of Current Score

WGI's overall raw score is estimated to be -0.36 on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale …

… which results in an MCC score of -0.07 (44% @ LMIC), which is passing.

Source	Source Name	2023 Weight	2017 score	2018 score	2019 score	2020 score	2021 score	2022 score	2023 score
GII	Global Integrity Index (Africa Integrity Indicators)	0.23	0.50	0.56	0.54	0.54	0.50	0.54	0.52
ADB	African Development Bank	0.16	0.58	0.59	0.59	0.62	0.63	0.63	0.64
EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
WMO	Global Insight Business Conditions (S&P Global)	0.26	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.61	0.61	0.61
PIA	Policy and Institutional Assessment (WB)	0.14	0.47	0.47	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.53	0.53
GCS	Global Competitiveness Report (WEF)	0.12	--	--	0.45	0.44	0.45	0.50	0.55
BTI	Bertlesmann Transformation Index	0.13	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.54	0.54	0.55	0.55
PRS	Political Risk Services International	0.09	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.25
GWP	Gallup World Poll	0.03	0.39	0.39	0.48	0.54	0.43	0.44	0.49
IFD	IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments	0.03	0.30	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.38	0.38	0.38
AFR	Afrobarometer	0.01	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.54
IPD	Institutional Profiles Database	--	0.54	0.54	0.54	--	--	--	

WBS	World Bank Entreprise Surveys	0.02						0.51
WGI	**Total Score**	-0.74	-0.57	-0.48	-0.51	-0.50	-0.33	-0.36
MCC		0.23	0.41	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05	0.08	-0.07
		LIC	LIC	LMIC	LMIC	LMIC	LMIC	LMIC
MCC %		63%	88%	43%	48%	45%	56%	44%

GII sub-scores used by WGI for Government Effectiveness

Sub-Indicator	Score (0-100) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
In practice, major public procurements involve competitive bidding.	50	
In practice, civil servants' work is not compromised by political interference.	25	
In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.	50	
In practice, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) produces detailed and timely data on employment.	25	
In practice, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) produces detailed and timely data on poverty.	50	
In practice, the independence of the Office of National Statistics (ONS) is guaranteed.	25	
In practice, there is a functioning safety monitoring system for air transport.	100	0.52
In practice, there is a government policy/strategy to increase the socio-economic integration of youth.	75	
In practice, there is a government social safety net to assist the elderly.	50	
In practice, there is a government social safety net to assist those who can't work due to a permanent or temporary illness or health condition.	50	
In practice, there is a government social safety net to compensate for unemployment.	50	
In practice, there are health campaigns to educate citizens on common illnesses and prevention and alerting them of public health hazards such as epidemics.	75	

ADB sub-score used by WGI for Government Effectiveness

Sub-indicator	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Quality of Public Admin	4	0.60
Quality of Budget & Financial Mgt	4.375	0.68
Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization	4.25	0.65
Total		**0.64**

EIU sub-scores used by WGI for Government Effectiveness

Sub-Indicator	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Quality of bureaucracy / institutional effectiveness	3	0.25
Excessive bureaucracy / red tape	3	

WMO score = 0.61

WMO / IHS Markit (Now S&P Global) is a paid commercial service, so we don't have the sub-scores, but WGI uses three WMO survey questions:

1. *Infrastructure disruption*. This reflects the likelihood of disruption to and/or inadequacy of infrastructure for transport, including due to terrorism/insurgency, strikes, politically motivated shutdowns, natural disasters; infrastructure includes (as relevant) roads, railways, airports, ports, and customs checkpoints.
2. *State failure*. The risk the state is unable to exclusively ensure law and order, and the supply of basic goods such as food, water, infrastructure, and energy, or is unable to respond to or manage current or likely future emergencies, including natural disasters and financial or economic crises.
3. *Policy instability*. The risk the government's broad policy framework shifts over the next year, making the business environment more challenging. This might include more onerous employment or environmental regulation; local content requirements; import/export barriers, tariffs, or quotas; other protectionist measures; price controls or caps; more "political" control of monetary policy, or simply more direct intervention into the operations and decisions of private companies etc

PIA sub-score used by WGI for Government Effectiveness

Sub-indicator	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Quality of Public Admin	3.5	0.50
Quality of Budget & Financial Mgt	4.0	0.60
Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization	3.5	0.50
Total		**0.53**

Calculation of Target Score

Target score on MCC scale = **+0.28 (68%)**

Equivalent on WGI scale = **-0.12**

      Similar score to Morocco

Improve WMO raw score **from 0.61 to 0.65**

Improve EIU raw from **0.25 to 0.40**

Sub-Indicator	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
	Current	Current	Target	Target
Quality of bureaucracy / institutional effectiveness	3	0.25	2	0.40
Excessive bureaucracy / red tape	3		2	

Improve GII raw score from 0.52 to 0.70

Sub-Indicator	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
	Current	Current	Target	Target
Public procurements and competitive bidding	50		75	
Civil servants without political interference	25		50	
Civil servants appointed by merit	50		75	
ONS data on employment	25		75	
ONS data on poverty	50		50	
ONS independence	25	0.52	50	0.70
Safety monitoring for air transport	100		100	
Increase socio-economic integration of youth	75		75	
Social safety net for the elderly	50		75	
Social safety net for illness or health	50		75	
Social safety net for unemployment.	50		75	
Health campaigns	75		100	

Improve ADB faw score from 0.64 to 0.65

Sub-indicator	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
	Current	Current	Target	Target
Quality of Public Admin	4	0.60	4.15	0.65
Quality of Budget & Financial Mgt	4.375	0.68	4.5	0.70
Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization	4.25	0.65	4.25	0.65
Total		0.64		0.65

Improve PIA raw score from 0.53 to 0.60

Sub-indicator	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
	Current	Current	Target	Target
Quality of Public Admin	3.5	0.50	4.0	0.60
Quality of Budget & Financial Mgt	4.0	0.60	4.0	0.60
Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization	3.5	0.50	4.0	0.60
Total		0.53		0.60

Target score may use other countries as a guide:

	WGI Re-scaled from source					WGI (-2.5 to +2.5)	MCC
	EIU	WMO	GII	PIA	ADB		
CI Current	0.25	0.61	0.52	0.53	0.64	-0.36	-0.07 (44%)
CI Target	0.40	0.61	0.70	0.60	0.65	-0.05 (est.)	+0.28 (68%)
Morocco	0.38	0.67	0.73	--	--	-0.04	+0.29 (70%)
Ghana	0.25	0.61	0.60	0.50	0.67	-0.09	0.20 (67%)

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

A review of the sub-indicators for EIU, WMO, GII, ADB, and ADB indicates that the most urgent areas for reform are:
1. Decrease government red tape and improve government operations (see actions under the corruption strategy and actions to digitize government operations.)
2. Improve quality and integrity of the civil service; base employment and advancement on merit and remove patronage.
3. Improve the independence and quality of the Office of National Statistics.

Examples of specific reforms could include:
Civil Service Integrity
- Review government employment policies and change them to better reward merit and performance in the workplace while prohibiting patronage.
- Change the language in article 61 and 63 of ordonnance n° 2013-660 of 20 September 2013 to explicitly state that these laws apply to public officials
- Add language to article 78 and 81 of Law N° 92-570 of 11 September 1992 regarding how soon public officials can take certain jobs in the private sector.

Public Management
- Implement the corruption strategy and increase the digitization of government processes and activities, especially those providing service to the public.
- Increase audits of: 1) public procurements, 2) financial records of state-owned companies, 3) financial records of public or private corporations which exploit natural resources (gas, oil, mining).
- Increase the capacity of the legislature to have greater oversight of public funds.
- Increase the public availability and publishing of the full President's proposed budget and approved budget.

Statistics
- Increase the independence of ONS.
- Improve collection of data, particularly on employment and poverty.

Rule of Law	Priority: Very High #2 of 20

Minister of Responsibility:
M. JEAN SANSAN KAMBILE Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice et des Droits de l'Homme
Focal Point : Jean-Yves MELLES

Indicator Institutions:
WGI / various

	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(-1.5 – 1.5) **-0.24** **MEDIAN = 0.00**	(0 – 100) **41%**
TARGET	**0.11**	**60%**

Country	Raw WGI FY25
Samoa	0,901
Bhutan	0,668
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	0,644
Kiribati	0,588
Cape Verde	0,400
Jordan	0,258
India	0,188
Vanuatu	0,141
Viet Nam	-0,085
Sri Lanka	-0,091
Ghana	-0,100
Morocco	-0,128
Tunisia	-0,139
Egypt, Arab Rep.	-0,184
Solomon Islands	-0,263
Philippines	-0,418
Côte d'Ivoire	-0,461
Bangladesh	-0,503
Papua New Guinea	-0,540
Eswatini	-0,598
São Tomé and Principe	-0,695
Uzbekistan	-0,833
Congo, Rep.	-1,021
Honduras	-1,095
Djibouti	-1,125
Lebanon	-1,165
Bolivia	-1,219
Nicaragua	-1,278

BOTTOM LINE

The Rule of Law indicator is somewhat close to the median; based on the WGI raw score a major effort to improve is needed to move ahead of other countries.

Strong Rule of Law is essential for investors as they evaluate markets for expansion. Sub-scores show strong improper political influence and corruption in the judiciary. A system to resolve disputes fairly and a professional, equitable legal system is a cornerstone of a competitive and advanced economy.

The Ivorian judicial system is average among African countries, but lags badly behind middle-income countries globally. Major reform and investment are needed to modernize judicial processes, build expertise, and improve infrastructure while reducing corruption in the judiciary. Enhancing intellectual and physical property rights will also raise the score on this indicator.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

1. **Engage the Minister of Justice directly to increase the effectiveness of the judiciary; increase intellectual property rights; and improve professionalism of law enforcement. Conduct a special workshop for the local data sources from World Justice Project.**

2. **Start now to draft an "Update Memo" that documents activities and improvements during 2022-2024 and transmit to EIU, PIA, ADB, and WJP by January - February 2025.**

3. **The most urgent areas for reform are:**
    a. **Strengthen protections of intellectual property**
    b. **Strengthen protections of private property rights**
    c. **Build a stronger firewall between the executive and judiciary**
    d. **Strengthen anti-corruption measures in the judiciary (including through greater digitization of judicial systems and record keeping)**
    e. **Improve the professionalization of the police through more training and accountability.**

4. **The Minister of Justice is the critical player to lead these improvements.**
We can work with his focal point to determine the specific policy reforms that will have the greatest impact.

    A. **Engage EIU and WJP to review specific issues that contribute to the Rule of Law indictor.**
        - **EIU: Pay for a subscription to EIU and engage the analysts**
        - **WJP for improving the MCC indicator and Rule of Law more generally**
    B. **Engage the Minister of Justice to review the scores of Cote d'Ivoire on the Rule of Law and develop and implement specific reforms listed above. (Work with Jean-Yves MELLES)**

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures the extent to which individuals and firms have confidence in and abide by the rules of society; in particular, it measures the functioning and independence of the judiciary, including the police, the protection of property rights, the quality of contract enforcement, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. Countries are evaluated on the following factors:

- public confidence in the police force and judicial system; popular observance of the law; a tradition of law and order; strength and impartiality of the legal system;
- prevalence of petty crime, violent crime, and organized crime; foreign kidnappings; economic impact of crime on local businesses; prevalence of human trafficking; government commitment to combating human trafficking;

- the extent to which a well-functioning and accountable police force protects citizens and their property from crime and violence; when serious crimes do occur, the extent to which they are reported to the police and investigated;
- security of private property rights; protection of intellectual property; the accuracy and integrity of the property registry; whether citizens are protected from arbitrary and/or unjust deprivation of property;
- the enforceability of private contracts and government contracts;
- the existence of an institutional, legal, and market framework for secure land tenure; equal access to land among men and women; effective management of common property resources; equitable user-rights over water resources for agriculture and local participation in the management of water resources;
- the prevalence of tax evasion and insider trading; size of the informal economy;
- independence, effectiveness, predictability, and integrity of the judiciary; compliance with court rulings; legal recourse for challenging government actions; ability to sue the government through independent and impartial courts; willingness of citizens to accept legal adjudication over physical and illegal measures; government compliance with judicial decisions, which are not subject to change except through judicial review;
- the independence of prosecutors from political direction and control;
- the existence of effective and democratic civilian state control of the police, military, and internal security forces through the judicial, legislative, and executive branches; the police, military, and internal security services respect human rights and are held accountable for any abuses of power;
- impartiality and nondiscrimination in the administration of justice; citizens are given a fair, public, and timely hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal; citizens have the right to independent counsel and those charged with serious felonies are provided access to independent counsel when it is beyond their means; low-cost means are available for pursuing small claims; citizens can pursue claims against the state without fear of retaliation;
- protection of judges and magistrates from interference by the executive and legislative branches; judges are appointed, promoted, and dismissed in a fair and unbiased manner; judges are appropriately trained to carry out justice in a fair and unbiased manner; members of the national-level judiciary must give reasons for their decisions; existence of a judicial ombudsman (or equivalent agency or mechanism) that can initiate investigations and impose penalties on offenders;
- law enforcement agencies are protected from political interference and have sufficient budgets to carry out their mandates; appointments to law enforcement agencies are made according to professional criteria; law enforcement officials are not immune from criminal proceedings;
- the existence of an independent reporting mechanism for citizens to complain about police actions; timeliness of government response to citizen complaints about police actions.

Mathematical Formula of Indicator

The database of the World Bank's World Governance Indicators (WGI) contains the sources, calculations, and sources:

Country data by source
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports
1. Go to Interactive Data access
2. Go to Country Data View
Weights by source
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents
3. Go to the link on Step 3 of the WGI Aggregated Methodology
Surveys used
4. Go to Documentation → WGI Aggregation Methodology
5. Go to Step 2, data files link

MCC Methodology

MCC Normalized Score = WGI Score - median score

MCC adjusts the median for each of the two scorecard income pools to zero for each of the four WGI indicators. Country scores are calculated by taking the difference between raw scores and the median. For example, in FY24 the unadjusted median for LMIC countries on Control of Corruption was -0.54. To set the median at zero, MCC simply adds 0.54 to each country's score (the same thing as subtracting a negative 0.54). Therefore, as an example, Algeria's FY24 Control of Corruption score, which was originally -0.64, was adjusted to -0.10.

The FY25 scores come from the 2024 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset and largely reflect performance in calendar year 2023. The Worldwide Governance Indicators are updated annually. Each year, the World Bank and Brookings Institution also make minor backward revisions to the historical data. Prior to 2006, the World Bank released data every two years (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004).

Calculation of Current Score

WGI's overall raw score is -0.461 on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale …
… and an MCC score of -0.24 (41%) on the LMIC standard, which is failing.

Source	Source Name	2023 Weight	2017 score	2018 score	2019 score	2020 score	2021 score	2022 score	2023 score
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit	0.48	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.31	0.38	0.38
ADB	African Development Bank	0.17	0.57	0.57	0.57	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.63
WJP	World Justice Report	0.14	0.53	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.51	0.51	0.51
PIA	World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessments	0.14	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
WMO	Global Insight Business Conditions and Risk Indicators (S&P Global)	0.17	0.56	0.56	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67

Code	Indicator	Weight							
GII	Global Integrity Index (Africa Integrity Indicators)	0.06	0.53	0.42	0.44	0.44	0.43	0.48	0.48
GCS	Global Competitiveness Survey (WEF)	0.05			0.39	0.40	0.41	0.44	0.45
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index	0.04	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
PRS	Political Risk Services International Country Risk	0.02	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
VDM	Varieties of Democracy Project	0.03	0.58	0.66	0.60	0.45	0.46	0.45	0.46
TPR	US State Department Trafficking in People Report	0.02	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67
AFR	Afrobarometer	0.01	0.76	0.78	0.78	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60
IFD	IFAD Rural Sector Performance Assessments	0.03	0.40	0.58	0.58	0.58	0.45	0.45	0.45
GWP	Gallup World Poll	0.01	0.60	0.60	0.67	0.65	0.68	0.72	0.72
IPD	Institutional Profiles Database	--	0.47	0.47	0.47	--	--	--	--
HER	Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom	--	--	--	--	-	-	--	--
WBS	World Bank Entreprise Surveys	0.02							0.75
WGI	**Total score**		**-0.63**	**-0.58**	**-0.57**	**-0.60**	**-0.63**	**-0.48**	**-0.46**
MCC			**0.25**	**0.41**	**-0.15**	**-0.06**	**-0.18**	**-0.16**	**-0.24**
			LIC	**LIC**	**LMIC**	**LMIC**	**LMIC**	**LMIC**	**LMIC**
MCC %			**69%**	**75%**	**39%**	**42%**	**42%**	**47%**	**41%**

EIU sub-scores used by WGI for Rule of Law.

(No change from last year)

Sub-Indicator	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Violent crime	2	
Organized crime	3	
Fairness of judicial process	3	
Enforceability of contracts	2	0.38
Speediness of judicial process	2	
Confiscation/expropriation	2	
Protection of intellectual property rights	3	
Protection of private property	3	

ADB sub-score used by WGI (only one sub-score used)

(Increased from 0.60 to 0.63 from last year)

Sub-indicator	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Property rights and rule-based governance	4.125	0.63

WJP sub-score used by WGI

Sub-indicator	Score (0.00 – 1.00) Higher is better	Global Rank (out of 142)		WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Factor 5.1: Crime is effectively controlled	0.67	#100		
Factor 7: Civil Justice				
7.1 People can access and afford civil justice	0.52	#92		
7.2 Civil justice is free of discrimination	0.59	#56		
7.3 Civil justice is free of corruption	0.36	#114		
7.4 Civil justice is free of improper government influence	0.29	#118	Factor 7: 0.51 #75	
7.5 Civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delay	0.55	#33		
7.6 Civil justice is effectively enforced	0.59	#37		
7.7 Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible, impartial, and effective	0.67	#62		0.51
Factor 8: Criminal Justice				
8.1 Criminal investigations system is effective	0.35	#95		
8.2 Criminal adjudication system is timely and effective	0.49	#57		
8.3 Correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behavior	0.33	#89		
8.4 Criminal system is impartial	0.46	#78	Factor 8: 0.36 #99	
8.5 Criminal system is free of corruption	0.38	#109		
8.6 Criminal system is free of improper government influence	0.13	#133		
8.7 Due process of law and rights of the accused	0.39	#103		

https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2024/C%C3%B4te%20d'Ivoire/Criminal%20Justice/

NOTE: WJP does not accept external data or updates. It relies on local experts in Cote d'Ivoire that respond to surveys to assess conditions. Instead, progress and updates should be provided to these local Ivorian experts.

WJP Local Experts for Cote d'Ivoire

Name	Organization
Alexandre Bairo	SCPA KSK
Aliou Niangadou	Cabinet Niangadou
Allo Stephane Elisee Boli	KSK Societe d'Advocats
Andre Kouame Guillaume N'Guetta	Universite Alassane Ouattara de Bouake
Arsene K. Dable	Barreau de Cote d'Ivoire
Bi Manh Yoli	Universite Alassane Ouattara de Bouake
Carine Kouadio	Universite Felix Houphouet-Boigny de Cocody
Daugbley Guy Roland Kragbe	Institut Pasteur de Cote d'Ivoire

Eric Bably	BK & Associes
Fotienworo Mathias Coulibaly	Societe d'Advocats Jurisfortis
Francoise Angeline Assi-Kaudjhis-Offoumou	Association Internationale pour la Democratie (AID-Afrique)
Genevieve Diallo	REPSFECOCI
Geraldine Odehouri-Koudou	Barreau de Cote d'Ivoire
Hugues Kovizie N;Guessan	Association des Francophones pour le Developpment et la Paix (AFDP)
Jules Gotre	Amepouh
Junior Franck Wilfried Tigby	Ivoire Juriste
Kignaman Soro	KS & Associes
Komla Fabrice Folly	
Kone G. Dogbemin	SCPA NMVWY-Dogbemin & Associes
Paterne Mambo	Universite Felix Houphouet-Boigny d'Abidjan
Saa Barthelemy Tono	
Souleymane Sakho	SCPA Sakho-Yapobi-Fofana & Associes

PIA sub-score used by WGI (only one sub-score used)

Sub-indicator	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Property rights and rule-based governance	3.5	0.50

WMO score = 0.67
(no change from last year)
WMO / IHS Markit (Now S&P Global) is a paid commercial service, so we don't have the sub-scores, but WGI uses three WMO survey questions:

1. *Expropriation. The risk that the state or other sovereign political authority will deprive, expropriate, nationalise, or confiscate the assets of private businesses, whether domestic or foreign.*
2. *State contract alteration. The risk that a government or state body alters the terms of, cancels outright, or frustrates (usually through delay) contracts it has with private parties without due process.*
3. *Contract enforcement. The risk that the judicial system will not enforce contractual agreements between private-sector entities, whether domestic or foreign, due to inefficiency, corruption, bias, or an inability to enforce rulings promptly and firmly.*

Calculation of Target Score

JWI/McLean recommends a concentration on the sub-score from EIU because it has the highest weight. Also improve sub-scores from ADB, WJP, and PIA.
Target score on MCC scale = +**0.12 (~60%)**
Equivalent on WGI scale = **-0.11**
    Similar score as Morroco

Target EIU Sub-scores

Sub-Indicator	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
	Current	Current	Target	Target
Violent crime	2		2	
Organized crime	3	0.38	2	0.50
Fairness of judicial process	3		2	
Enforceability of contracts	2		2	

Speediness of judicial process	2		2
Confiscation/expropriation	2		2
Protection of intellectual property rights	3		2
Protection of private property	3		2

Since lower score is better, take the average of the sub-scores, divide by 4 then subtract 1 to get the re-scaled score.

Improve EIU from 0.38 **to 0.50** (WGI re-scaled) – above

Improve ADB to 4.5 (raw) / **0.65** (WGI re-scaled)

Sub-indicator	Curent Score (1-6) Higher is better	Current WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	TARGET Score (1-6) Higher is better	TARGET WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Property rights and rule-based governance	4.125	0.63		

Improve WJP to **0.60** (WGI re-scaled) - below

Detailed WJP Target Scores

Sub-indicator	Score (0.00 – 1.00) Higher is better / Global Rank (out of 142)	Target Score/ Rank		WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Factor 5.1: Crime is effectively controlled	0.67 (#100)	0.75 (#80)		
Factor 7: Civil Justice				
7.1 People can access and afford civil justice	0.52 (#92)	0.60 (#54)		
7.2 Civil justice is free of discrimination	0.59 (#56)	0.60 (#51)		
7.3 Civil justice is free of corruption	0.36 (#114)	0.45 (#75)	Factor 7:	
7.4 Civil justice is free of improper government influence	0.29 (#118)	0.45 #78	(Previous) 0.51, #75	
7.5 Civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delay	0.55 (#33)	0.55 (#34)		
7.6 Civil justice is effectively enforced	0.59 (#37)	0.61 (#35)	(Target) 0.55, #52	
7.7 Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are accessible, impartial, and effective	0.67 (#62)	0.65 (#66)		0.51
Factor 8: Criminal Justice				
8.1 Criminal investigations system is effective	0.35 (#95)	0.45 (#55)		
8.2 Criminal adjudication system is timely and effective	0.49 (#57)	0.55 (#55)	Factor 8:	
8.3 Correctional system is effective in reducing criminal behavior	0.33 (#89)	0.45 (#50)	(Previous) 0.36, #99	
8.4 Criminal system is impartial	0.46 (#78)	0.46 (#71)		
8.5 Criminal system is free of corruption	0.38 (#109)	0.45 (#90)	(Target) 0.44, #75	
8.6 Criminal system is free of improper government influence	0.13 (#133)	0.30 (#100)		

8.7 Due process of law and rights of the accused	0.39 (#103)	0.45 (#75)		

Improve PIA to 4.00 (raw) / **0.55** (WGI re-scaled)

Sub-indicator	Current Score (1-6) Higher is better	Current WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	TARGET Score (1-6) Higher is better	TARGET WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Property rights and rule-based governance	3.5	0.50	4.00	0.55

Keep WMO at 0.67 (WGI re-scaled)
Compared to Peer Countries

	WGI Re-scaled from source				WGI (-2.5 to +2.5)	MCC
	EIU	PIA	ADB	WJP		
Current	**0.38**	**0.50**	**0.63**	**0.51**	**-0.46**	**-0.24 (41%)**
Target	**0.50**	**0.55**	**0.65**	**0.60**	**-0.12 (est.)**	**+0.11 (~60%)**
Ghana	0.47	0.60	0.70	0.59	-0.10	+0.12 (~63%)
Morocco	0.50	--	--	0.51	-0.13	+0.10 (~59%)

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

1. **Draft a "Update Memo" that documents activities and improvements during 2022-2024 and transmit to EIU, PIA, ADB, and WJP by January - February 2025.**

2. **The most urgent areas for reform are:**
    a. **Strengthen protections of intellectual property**
    b. **Strengthen protections of private property rights**
    c. **Build a stronger firewall between the executive and judiciary**
    d. **Strengthen anti-corruption measures in the judiciary (including through greater digitization of judicial systems and record keeping)**
    e. **Improve the professionalization of the police through more training and accountability.**
3. **The Minister of Justice is the critical player to lead these improvements.**
We can work with his focal point to determine the specific policy reforms that will have the greatest impact.

4. **Engage EIU and WJP to review specific issues that contribute to the Rule of Law indictor.**
    - **EIU: Pay for a subscription to EIU and engage the analysts**
    - **WJP for improving the MCC indicator and Rule of Law more generally**
5. **Engage the Minister of Justice to review the scores of Cote d'Ivoire on the Rule of Law and develop and implement specific reforms listed above. (Work with Jean-Yves MELLES)**

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Land Rights and Access

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Priority: High #3 of 20

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	Normalized Land rights score

Country	Normalized Land rights score
Honduras	0,958
Tunisia	0,9
Sri Lanka	0,875
Cabo Verde	0,742
Ghana	0,729
Morocco	0,7
Bolivia	0,642
Philippines	0,633
Jordan	0,625
Bhutan	0,608
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0,563
Lebanon	0,542
Bangladesh	0,479
Congo, Rep.	0,471
India	0,45
Vanuatu	0,404
São Tomé and Principe	0,396
Côte d'Ivoire	**0,371**
Uzbekistan	0,333
Solomon Islands	0,292
VietNam	0,225
Djibouti	0,188
Papua New Guinea	0,104
Nicaragua	0,083
Eswatini	0,075
Ukraine	
Kiribati	
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	
Samoa	

Minister of Responsibility:
M. KOBENAN KOUASSI ADJOUMANI, Ministre d'Etat, Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Développement Rural
M. ADAMA COULIBALY, Ministre des Finances et du Budget
Focal Point : DJIRE Adama / Sambro N'GUESSAN Eugene / KANTE Kebe (AFOR)

Indicator Institutions:
IFAD / V-Dem

	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(0.0 — 1.0) **0.371** MEDIAN = 0.479	(0 – 100) **38%**
TARGET	**0.600**	**60%**

BOTTOM LINE

Private property rights is a cornerstone of economic development. For Côte d'Ivoire to advance among middle-income countries, it must strengthen its capacity and administrative systems to protect private property.

Complete the update with IFAD (in both Abidjan and Rome) to get higher scores reported to MCC.

Begin a push with V-Dem because the subscore gap is larger than IFAD compared to other countries and easier to easier to achieve progress.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

1. **Ensure IFAD data due in December 2024 is reviewed and sent to MCC; follow up with IFAD Abidjan and IFAD Rome for updating data during 2025.**
2. **Immediately begin engagement with V-Dem in Sweden to determine specifical reforms and data to provide for new areas of higher scores.**
3. **Director of the AFOR office to design and implement specific actions to lead these efforts supported by McLean/JWI.**

Description of the Indicator

This indicator evaluates the extent governments are investing in secure land tenure and property rights.

Methodology

This composite indicator is calculated as the weighted average of three indicators. The IFAD Access to Land is weighted 50% and the V-Dem Days and Cost to Register Property are each weighted 25%.

- *Access to Land:* Produced by IFAD, this indicator assesses the extent to which the institutional, legal, and market framework provides secure land tenure and equitable access to land in rural areas. It is made up of four subcomponents: (1) the effectiveness of the land tenure system; (2) the effectiveness of land markets; (3) the equitable management of communal lands; and (4) the existence of gender-based impediments to access. IFAD's operational staff base their assessments on a questionnaire and guideposts identifying the basis of each scoring level, available at https://webapps.ifad.org/members/gc/45/docs/GC-45-L-4-Add-1.pdf https://webapps.ifad.org/members/gc/42/docs/GC-42-L-6.pdf *or* https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/125/docs/EB-2018-125-R-4-Add-1.pdf. Past datasets can be found in the documents of IFAD's governing council https://webapps.ifad.org/members/gc.

Points of contact
- Mr. Messan, IFAD's Country Representative (Abidjan
- Ms. Sarrasoro, IFAD Country Program Coordinator (Abidjan)
- Kouakou Kouame, k.kouakou@ifad.org
- Sana Jatta s.jatta@ifad.org (+39) 349 695 1100 (Rome)

NOTE : IFAD is not a rating agency but an aid implementor, so its country surveys are used more for designing programs rather than annual published performance reports. Country evaluation reports are performed only once every several years; the most recent one for Cote d'Ivoire was performed in 2018 at the request and joint funding from the Government.

Rural Sector Performance Assessment Questionnaire

The Rural Sector Performance Assessment (RSPA) is a questionnaire IFAD uses to develop a measure of the quality of policies and institutions in areas related to rural

development and rural transformation, as well as some broader questions related to governance and macroeconomic performance. The RSPA captures robust information about the policy framework of a country, both on paper and in practice, and focuses on areas specific to the rural sector as well as areas that impact on a country's rural sector.

The RSPA is designed to measure the performance of country policy frameworks, specifically, the responsiveness of a country's policies to the needs of poor rural people. This is currently done through a questionnaire containing 19 questions organized around six thematic clusters.

The question below is related to access to land indicator, which is included in the cluster 3 related to environmental policies and practice.

3.1 Environmental assessment policies and grievances
3.2 National climate change adaptation policies and cross-governmental coordination
3.3 Access to land
3.4 Access to water

3.3: Access to land indicator

Question

Please determine the access afforded to rural people via the policy framework to land, which is key to their capacity to undergo rural transformation. To determine the score consider factors affecting the quality of policies affecting the governance of land and the effectiveness of their implementation, including:

(i) the effectiveness of the land tenure system,
(ii) market effectiveness,
(iii) the equitable management of communal lands,
(iv) the existence of gender-based impediments to access.

Key sources
- National, policies legislation and statistics;
- National development plans / PRSP;
- Gender and land rights database http://www.fao.org/gender-land rights database/en/;
- World Bank indicators on land tenure and water / irrigation;
- Land Governance Assessment Framework (LGAF) at country level;
- USAID Land Links Country Profiles;
- Research prepared by international and/or academic organizations on land tenure/land use.

Ratings

1. The policy framework for land tenure provides highly unequal access to land and no security (especially for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration is highly inefficient and non-transparent, does not consider customary access systems when relevant, and land markets are exclusively informal. There is no regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources.

2. The policy framework for land tenure provides unequal access to land and very limited
security (especially for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration is inefficient with little transparency and weak capacity to address conflicts, does not consider customary systems when relevant, and land markets are mostly informal. There is unclear regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources.

3. The policy framework for land tenure infrequently provides equal access to land and is
seldom secure (especially for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration shows major weaknesses and informal land markets are very important. There is unclear regulation and poor enforcement of regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources.

4. The policy framework for land tenure sometimes provides equal access to land and is sometimes secure (especially for women, youth minorities and indigenous people). Land administration shows minor weaknesses, recognizing to some extent customary systems when relevant, and formal land markets exist. There is regulation and enforcement regarding the management and use of common property resources using to some extent customary rules when relevant, but these regulations and enforcement mechanisms are open to interpretation and not always consistent.

5. The policy framework for land tenure largely provides equal access to land and is mostly secure (especially for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration is generally efficient and transparent, recognises customary systems when relevant and land markets provide good access for rural poor. There is clear and routinely enforced regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources using customary systems when relevant.

6. The policy framework for land tenure provides equal access to land and is secure (especially for women, youth, minorities and indigenous people). Land administration is efficient and transparent, recognises customary systems when relevant, and rural poor have full access to land markets. There is fully transparent and systematically enforced regulation regarding the management and use of common property resources using customary systems when relevant.

- *Property Rights (v2xcl-prpty):* Produced by the Varieties of Democracy Institute (V-Dem), this index measures the rights to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. It measures both de jure limits on legal property rights, but also de facto limits that may come in the form of customary law, religious law, common practice, or social norms. This indicator is assessed separately for men and women, and then averaged together. V-Dem gathers these data by surveying experts and aggregating their answers into a single index. More information on V-Dem's methodology can be found here https://www.v-dem.net/en/our-work/methods/.

  V-Dem Land Rights and Access: The scores in the MCC scorecard may include one or more of the variables and indices listed below, but V-Dem is unsure which ones are used by MCC for its calculations.

  The question and possible answers are scored from 0-4.

  The V-Dem Indices are aggregates of many different variables/indicators. For more information on each one, please visit the codebook. Relevant Indices for the topics of land rights and access as well as equal employment would be the following:

  -Equal Access Index (D)--page 56 of the Code Book
  -Equal Distribution of Resources (D) - page 56 of the Code Book -Egalitarian component index (D)- page 57 of the Code Book

  A: Land Rights and Access

  3.8.4 Property Rights
  3.8.4.1 State ownership of economy (C) (v2clstown)
  Question: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?
  Clarification: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital(including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors. It does not measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

  0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be oÿcially prohibited.
  1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.
  2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.
  3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.

4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

3.8.4.3 Property rights for women (C) (v2clprptyw)
Question: Do women enjoy the right to private property?
Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property. This question does not ask you to assess the relative rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal— and very minimal — property rights

0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.
1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.
4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.
5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

5.9.3 Property rights (D) (v2xcl_prpty)
Question: Do citizens enjoy the right to private property?
Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them; customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property. Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source(s): v2clprptym v2clprptyw
Data release: 1-13.

Point of Contact for V-Dem:
sil@v-dem.net
evie.papada@v-dem.net
josefine.pernes@v-dem.net

All information in this document is taken from the latest v-dem codebook:
https://www.v- dem.net/documents/24/codebook_v13.pdf

MCC Aggregation Methodology

MCC's Land Rights and Access Score = (0.5 x Normalized IFAD) + (0.5 x Normalized V-Dem)

This index draws on 2021 "Access to Land" data from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) and 2023 data from V-Dem on Property rights (v2xcl-prpty). Country scores are reported on the Scorecards as 2023 data. When only one sub-source is missing, the normalized score for the other is used. When both are missing the indicator is missing.

Since each of the two sub-components of this index have different scales, MCC created a common scale for each of the indicators by normalizing them. Please see equations below. Each country is given a percentile rank between 0 and 1 for its income pool for each sub-source, excluding missing values. Then those sub-source percentile ranks are averaged together. When only one sub-source is missing, the other is used. When both are missing the indicator is missing.

MCC Methodology to Normalize IFAD and V-Dem Data:
MCC has updated its methodology for normalizing subscores to better account for missing data. As a result, the scores from FY25 are not comparable to scores from FY24 and earlier.

Normalized IFAD :

$$\frac{\textit{(\# countries scoring below CIV on IFAD's raw data)}}{\textit{(\# countries scoring = or > than CIV) + (\# countries scoring < CIV)}}$$

Normalized V-Dem :
$$\frac{\textit{(\# countries scoring below CIV on V-Dem raw data)}}{\textit{(\# countries scoring = or > than CIV) + (\# countries scoring < CIV)}}$$

MCC does not include missing values in these calculations. For the final score, MCC averages the normalized values for IFAD and V-Dem. If IFAD or V-Dem are missing, the normalized score for the other is used, but if both are missing the indicator is assigned an "N/A".

Calculation of current Score
NOTE: IFAD scores are not typically produced as an annual index; rather IFAD assesses countries based on available funding, which may lead to time lags of several years.

Normalized IFAD =
$$\frac{\textit{(\# countries scoring below CIV on IFAD's raw data)}}{\textit{(\# countries scoring = or > than CIV) + (\# countries scoring < CIV)}}$$

For Cote d'Ivoire with the score of **3.7**

Number of countries scoring equal to or greater than **3.7: 13 countries**.

Countries scoring below **3.7: 8 countries**.

Total countries = 8 + 13 = 21

Normalized IFAD = $\dfrac{8}{8 + 13}$ = **0.381**

Normalized Property Rights =

$$\dfrac{\text{(\# countries scoring below CIV on V-Dem raw data)}}{\text{(\# countries scoring = or > than CIV) + (\# countries scoring < CIV)}}$$

V-Dem raw score for Cote d'Ivoire: **593**
Number of countries scoring equal to or greater than 593: 9 countries.
Countries scoring below 593: 15 countries.
Total countries = 9 + 15 = 24

Normalized V-Dem = $\dfrac{9}{9 + 15}$ = **0.375**

MCC's Land Rights and Access Score =

(0.5 x Normalized IFAD) + (0.5 x Normalized V-Dem)

$\dfrac{\textbf{(0.5 x 0.381) + (0.5 x 0.375)}}{\textbf{2}}$ = **0.377**

Calculation of Target Score

Target Score = 0.600 (60%)

	VDEM Raw	IFAD Raw	MCC
Current	**692**	**3.7**	**0.371 (38%)**
Target	**825**	**3.8**	**0.600 (60%)**
Ghana	874	3.8	0.729 (83%)
Morocco	683	4	0.700 (79%)
Philippines	551	3.9	0.633 (71%)

NOTE: The gap between CIV current scores is much larger for V-Dem subscores than for IFAD subscores. This presents an opportity to make a larger increase with V-Dem.

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score
1. Ensure IFAD data due in December 2024 is reviewed and sent to MCC.
2. Follow up with IFAD Abidjan and IFAD Rome for updating data during 2025.
3. The V-Dem score is further behind other countries than IFAD. Urgently engage V-Dem in Sweden to determine specific reforms and data to provide.
4. Assign the Director of the AFOR office to design and implement specific actions.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">Access to Credit</td><td>Priority: High
#4 of 20</td></tr>
</table>

Access to Credit	**Priority: High #4 of 20**

Responsible Official :
M. ADAMA COULIBALY, Ministre des Finances et du Budget
Focal Point : Sambro N'GUESSAN Eugene

Indicator Institutions:
IMF Financial Institution Access
World Bank: Findex

	Raw Score	**MCC %**
CURRENT	(0.00 — 1.00) **0.302** **MEDIAN = 0.499**	(0 – 100) **26%**
TARGET	**0.550**	**62%**

Country	Normalized AC score
Cabo Verde	0,963
Bolivia	0,904
Samoa	0,889
Vanuatu	0,852
Bhutan	0,815
India	0,748
Sri Lanka	0,722
São Tomé and Principe	0,667
Uzbekistan	0,647
Eswatini	0,642
Ghana	0,56
Morocco	0,547
Philippines	0,535
Jordan	0,521
Tunisia	0,477
VietNam	0,446
Bangladesh	0,435
Honduras	0,414
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	0,37
Lebanon	0,352
Côte d'Ivoire	**0,302**
Egypt, Arab Rep.	0,263
Djibouti	0,259
Congo, Rep.	0,254
Nicaragua	0,196
Kiribati	0,148
Solomon Islands	0,111
Papua New Guinea	0
Ukraine	

BOTTOM LINE

Côte d'Ivoire continues to lag behind middle income countries.

Of the two rating agencies, FINDEX provides a more comprehensive measure compared to the IMF. A strong engagement with FINDEX is more important for developing a targeted reform strategy to improve performance.

While not yet used by MCC, the new Business Ready report by the World Bank (the long-awaited replacement for the Doing Business Report) has a very good Financial Services section with subscores and rankings.

The Minister of Finance should initiate a campaign to increase the use of banking and mobile money services among the Ivorian population combined with strengthening the integrity of banks from default.

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures the level of financial inclusion in a country as measured by the share of adults that have a financial or mobile money account and the number of bank branches and ATMs per 100,000 adults and

NOTE: MCC previously used data from the World Bank's Doing Business Report until it was suspended in 2021. However, in October 2024, the World Bank released its follow-on methodology called Business Ready or B-READY. It is possible that MCC will change the indicator back to the Worl Bank data.

Methodology

Indicator Institution Methodology

The Access to Credit composite indicator is calculated by taking the simple average of two indicators from the IMF and Findex, which have been normalized and ranked on equivalent scales:

> *Financial Institution Access (IMF):* MCC uses the Financial Institution Access indicator from the IMF's Financial Development Index. This indicator has two sub indicators:
> - The number of bank branches per 100,000 adults from the World Bank's FinStats,
> - The number of ATMs per 100,000 adults from the IMF's Financial Access Surveys.

> *Share of adults with an account (Findex):* From the World Bank's Findex Database, MCC uses the share of the population (adults 15+) with an account. This survey counts both accounts with traditional financial institutions and mobile money.

Note: JWI/McLean believes that the IMF data for bank branchs and ATMs are an ineffective method to measure access to credit. However, the Findex method and data is excellent.

MCC Methodology

MCC's Access to Credit Score = (0.5 × Normalized IMF) + (0.5 × Normalized Findex)

This index draws on 2020 data from the Findex database (as well as 2021 data for those countries added to the dataset in the March 2023 update) and 2021 data published in 2023 by the IMF. Country scores are reported on the scorecards as 2022 data. When one indicator is missing data, the other is used. Since each of the two sub-components of this index have different scales,

MCC created a common scale for each of the indicators by normalizing them. Please see equations below. Both scales are then inverted so that a higher score corresponds to better performance.

<u>MCC Methodology to Normalize IMF and Findex Data:</u>

MCC has updated its methodology for normalizing subscores to better account for missing data. As a result, the scores from FY25 are not comparable to scores from FY24 and earlier.

Normalized formula for IMF subscore

$$\frac{(\text{\# countries scoring below CIV on IMF raw data})}{(\text{\# countries scoring} = or > \text{ than CIV}) + (\text{\# countries scoring} < CIV)}$$

Normalized formula for FINDEX subscore

$$\frac{(\text{\# countries scoring below CIV on FINDEX raw data})}{(\text{\# countries scoring} = or > \text{ than CIV}) + (\text{\# countries scoring} < CIV)}$$

Similar to the normalization of the Land Rights indicators, MCC does not include missing values in these calculations. For the final score, MCC averages the normalized values for IFAD and V-Dem. If IFAD or V-Dem are missing, the normalized score for the other is used, but if both are missing the indicator is assigned an "N/A".

Source
- Financial Development Index (IMF)
    - http://data.imf.org/?sk=F8032E80-B36C-43B1-AC26-493C5B1CD33B
    - MOmoev@imf.org

- World Bank Findex Database (Findex)
    - http://globalfindex.worldbank.org/
    - lklapper@worldbank.org

Calculation of Current Score

Normalized IMF =

$$\frac{(\text{\# countries scoring below CIV on IMF raw data})}{(\text{\# countries scoring} = or > \text{ than CIV}) + (\text{\# countries scoring} < CIV)}$$

For Cote d'Ivoire with the score of **0.09**
 Number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults: *4.20*
 The number of ATMs per 100,000 adults: *5.67*
 https://data.imf.org/?sk=E5DCAB7E-A5CA-4892-A6EA-598B5463A34C

Number of countries scoring equal to or greater than 0.09: 26 countries

Countries scoring below 0.09: 2 countries.

Total countries = 2+ 26 = 28

Normalized IMF = 2/28 = **0.071**

Normalized Findex =

(# countries scoring below CIV on FINDEX raw data)
(# countries scoring = or > than CIV) +(# countries scoring < CIV)

For Cote d'Ivoire with the score of **0,5076 (50.76%)**
Number of countries scoring equal to or greater than 0,5076: 8 countries.
Countries scoring below 0,5076: 9 countries.
Total countries = 9 + 8 = 17
Normalized Findex = 9/17 = **0.529**

MCC's Access to Credit Score =

(0.5 x IMF) + (0.5 x FINDEX) = **Score**

(0.5 x 0.071) + (0.5 x 0.529) = **0.302**

Calculation of Target Score

The main weakness in this indicator is the number of banks and ATMs 100,000 people and should be improved substantially. The Findex sub-indicator can be improved marginally.

A suitable target score would be close to **Ghana 0.56 (63%)**:

Financial Institution Access (IMF):	*0.19*
Number of commercial bank branches per 100,000 adults:	*5.75*
The number of ATMs per 100,000 adults:	*10.69*
Share of adults with an account (Findex):	*68.23%*

A raw score of 0.55 would be passing at 62%.

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

The best market-driven strategy is for the Minister of Finance to implement a campaign to get more Ivorians to use the financial services of banks accompanied by security measures to ensure the high integrity of banks.

Perhaps the most direct, rapid, and cost-effective approach would be to promote mobile financial services, which are included in the FINDEX data collections and would be most user-friendly and accepted by the general population.

Greater demand for bank services will naturally increase the Findex score (percent of people over 15 years old with a bank account), but also increase the demand for bank branches and ATM machines to access funds.

Engage FINDEX directly as they see Cote d'Ivoire as a success story with their methodology with much opportunity for further improvement.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2" style="background-color:red">Education Expenditures</td><td colspan="2">Priority: High #5 of 20</td></tr>
</table>

Country	Gov Exp
Kiribati	14,2
Vanuatu	10,64
Solomon Islands	8,29
Bolivia	7,58
Tunisia	6,73
Eswatini	6,31
Samoa	6,11
Morocco	6,02
Bhutan	5,85
Uzbekistan	5,47
São Tomé and Principe	5,16
Cape Verde	4,67
India	4,12
Honduras	4,05
Nicaragua	3,79
Philippines	3,62
Côte d'Ivoire	3,43
Jordan	3,16
Congo, Rep.	2,95
Ghana	2,91
Viet Nam	2,89
Sri Lanka	1,83
Bangladesh	1,78
Papua New Guinea	1,35
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	
Egypt, Arab Rep.	
Djibouti	
Lebanon	

Minister of Responsibility:
MME MARIATOU KONE, Ministre de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation
M. ADAMA COULIBALY, Ministre des Finances et du Budget
Primature
Focal Point : MEITE Inza/ KONE Raoul
Sambro N'GUESSAN Eugene

Indicator Institution: **UNESCO**

	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(0 — 8) **3.43** MEDIAN = 4.12	(0 – 100) **31%**
TARGET	**4.70**	**52%**

BOTTOM LINE

To improve the score, education spending must grow at a rate faster than GDP growth AND faster than the median increase among all LMIC countries.

To achieve a passing score, we estimate that Côte d'Ivoire would need to increase its education budget from $2.7 billion USD in 2023 to approximately $3.91 billion USD in 2024 and slightly more in 2025.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

DATA:
- **Engage the Minister of Education to collect the necessary data over the most recent three years to compare with the data published by UNESCO.**
- **Engage UNESCO directly to confirm correct data.**

ACTION:
- **Adjust the budget for Education to increase the performance of Cote d'Ivoire to pass above the median.**

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures the government's commitment to investing in education.

MCC uses data from the Institute of Statistics (UIS) of the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

MCC changed this indicator for the FY2024 scored card from expenditures on *primary* education to expenditures on education *overall*.

Methodology

Mathematical Formula of the Indicator

$$\frac{\textbf{(Government spending on education)}}{\textbf{GDP}}$$

Indicator Institution Methodology

UNESCO/UIS measures total current and capital expenditure on education at every level of administration—central, regional, and local. UIS data generally include subsidies for private education, but not foreign aid for education. UIS data may also exclude spending by religious schools.

Government outlays on education include expenditures on services provided to individual pupils and students and expenditures on services provided on a collective basis.

MCC Methodology

This indicator measures public expenditure on education as a percent of GDP. MCC uses the UIS sub-indicator named "Government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP."

Because the score is measured as a percent of GDP, expenses on education must increase faster than the growth rate of GDP to raise the score.

For FY24, MCC will use the most recent UNESCO data from 2017 or later. If a country does not have score since 2017, it does not receive an FY24 score.

For the GDP in the deonominator, UNESCO uses World Bank data estimates. As better data become available, UNESCO makes backward revisions to historical data.

Because MCC revised its methodology for this indicator to shift from a focus on Primary Education Expenditures to Education Expenditures, the scores from FY24 are not comparable to scores from FY23 and earlier.

Calculation of Current Score
http://sdg4-data.uis.unesco.org/
http://data.uis.unesco.org/

The score ($/GDP) is taken directly from the source website (above).

Indicator Name	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP (%)	3,21	3,44	3,79	3,37	3,52	3,43
Government expenditure on education in US$ (millions)	1879,5	2060,9	2386,7	2422,0	2464,5	2702,40

Indicator Name	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
GDP in US$ (millions)	58522,5	59898,5	62982,8	71811,1	70018,7	78887
GDP growth (annual %, WB)	4,84	6,52	1,74	6,99	6,74	6,5

$$\frac{\text{Government spending on education}}{\text{GDP}}$$

For 2023 → UNESCO records total expenditure on education)= $2.7024 billion
GDP (2023) = $78.887 billion

$$\frac{\$\,2.702 \text{ billion}}{\$\,78.887 \text{ billion}} = 3.425\%$$

Calculation of Target Score

Target Score = **4.70 %**

To determine a target expenditure, the current expenditure amount (in USD$) and GDP (in current $USD) is used.

For 2023
      World Bank records GDP = $78.887 billion
      A target of 4.7% requires an expenditure of **$3.71 billion**

For 2024
      Based on data provided by the World Bank on GDP growth, we estimate that the average GDP growth rate is about 6%.

      Assume GDP growth of 6%, so GDP = $83.620 billion
A target of 4.7% requires an expenditure of **$3.91 billion (or about 2443.75 billion CFA at 625 CFA/$)**

For 2025
      Assume GDP growth of 6%, so GDP = $88637,2 billion
A target of 4.7% requires an expenditure of **$4.17 billion (or about 2603.71 billion CFA)**

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

DATA:
- **Engage the Minister of Education to collect the necessary data over the most recent three years to compare with the data published by UNESCO.**
- **Engage UNESCO directly to confirm correct data.**

ACTION:
- **Perform a "top-to-bottom" review of all education budgets to ensure all expenditures are being counted across all levels of education.**
- **Increase the budget for overall education at an appropriate rate that is faster than the growth of GDP AND faster than the increase of other countries to reach a score that is safely passing.**

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">Fiscal Policy</td><td>Priority: High
#6 of 20</td></tr>
</table>

Fiscal Policy	**Priority: High** **#6 of 20**

Minister of Responsibility:
M. ADAMA COULIBALY, Ministre des Finances et du Budget
Focal Point : Sambro N'GUESSAN Eugene

Indicator Institutions: **IMF**

	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(-20 – 10) **-5.6** **MEDIAN = - 4.1**	(0 – 100) **33%**
TARGET	**-4.0**	**56%**

Pays	FY25 score
Republic of Congo	5,46
Micronesia	4,61
Samoa	3,39
Nicaragua	0,67
Honduras	-0,85
SaoTomé and Principe	-0,89
Vietnam	-1,07
Solomon Islands	-1,54
Djibouti	-2,62
Vanuatu	-2,64
Lebanon	-3,20
Uzbekistan	-3,92
Cabo Verde	-3,98
Eswatini	-4,06
Bangladesh	-4,08
Morocco	-5,25
Philippines	-5,36
Papua New Guinea	-5,47
Côte d'Ivoire	**-5,64**
Bhutan	-5,82
Egypt	-6,17
Tunisia	-7,12
Jordan	-7,21
India	-8,93
Ghana	-9,11
Bolivia	-9,13
Kiribati	-10,45
Sri Lanka	-10,71

BOTTOM LINE

IMF data indicate slippage compared to other Lower Middle Income countries.

Forecasts from IMF and the Ministry of Finance project annual budget deficits to be reduced to 4.0% then 3.0%, which is good news. However, since the indicator takes a running three-year average, Cote d'Ivoire will probably not pass the median for 2-3 years without tighter fiscal management.

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures the government's commitment to prudent fiscal management and private sector growth. Net lending (+)/ borrowing (–) (or revenue minus expenditure) is calculated as revenue minus total expenditure measures whether general government is either putting financial resources at the disposal of other sectors in the economy and nonresidents (net lending), or utilizing the financial resources generated by other sectors and nonresidents (net borrowing).

The MCC score is a 3-year running average.

Mathematical Formula of the Indicator

General government net lending & borrowing as a % of GDP, averaged over a 3-year period.

Net lending/borrowing = Revenue - Total expenditure

Step 1: **Revenues – Expenditures** for years #1, #2, #3
$$\frac{\text{Revenues – Expenditures}}{\text{GDP}}$$

Step 2: **Year 1 + Year 2 + Year 3** = Indicator Score
$$\frac{\text{Year 1 + Year 2 + Year 3}}{3} = \text{Indicator Score}$$

This year's score represents the average annual data from 2021, 2022 and 2023. The MCC scorecard typically uses the October report; we can also check the April report to track progress. IMF often conducts backward revisions to the data.

October 2024
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/October

Official scores for 2020-2023; Forecasts provided for 2024+.

2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
-5.419	-4.859	-6.812	-5.242	-4.049	-3.044	-3.044	-2.965	-2.973

Calculation of Current Score FY23 Scorecard

October 2024 data

2021	2022	2023
-4.859	-6.812	-5.242

$$\frac{(2021 + 2022 + 2023)}{3} \rightarrow \frac{(-4.859-6.812-5.242)}{3} = \mathbf{-5.638}$$

Calculation of Target Score

Based on IMF estimates, CI is likely to have the following future scores:

MCC Scorecard FY26 (November 2025)

2022	2023	2024
-6.812	-5.242	-4.049

$$\frac{(-6.812-5.242-4.049)}{3} = \textbf{-5.368}$$

MCC Scorecard FY27 (November 2026)

2023	2024	2025
-5.242	-4.049	-3.044

$$\frac{(-5.242-4.049-3.044)}{3} = \textbf{-4.112}$$

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

We defer to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance for strategies to either reduce spending or increase public revenues.

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Political Rights

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Priority: Moderate #7 of 20

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Political Rights		**Priority: Moderate #7 of 20**

Minister of Responsibility:
M. JEAN SANSAN KAMBILE Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice et des Droits de l'Homme

Focal Point : Jean- Yves MELESS

Indicator Institution:
Freedom House

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Country	FY25 score
Cape Verde	38
Micronesia	37
Kiribati	37
Ghana	35
São Tomé and Principe	35
India	33
Samoa	32
Vanuatu	32
Bhutan	30
Solomon Islands	28
Bolivia	27
Philippines	25
Sri Lanka	22
Papua New Guinea	22
Honduras	22
Côte d'Ivoire	19
Tunisia	16
Bangladesh	15
Morocco	13
Lebanon	13
Jordan	11
Egypt	6
Djibouti	5
Viet Nam	4
Nicaragua	4
Uzbekistan	2
Congo, Rep.	2
Eswatini	1

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	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(0 — 40) **19** MEDIAN >17	(0 – 100) **41%**
TARGET	**23**	**50%**

BOTTOM LINE

Cote d'Ivoire passes this manditory indicator, but only by one point (18 is the minimum passing raw score). More work is need to achieve a higher score that is "safely" green.

The perceived political risk and potential for instability for Cote d'Ivoire remains high (based on a range of other indicators), which hurts foreign investment despite good economic management.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

1. **Draft a "Justification Memo" and send to Freedom House in January to cite improvements in Cote d'Ivoire during 2022-23, especially on survey questions where other rating agencies have a higher scores a the same topic.**
2. **Implement the Corruption strategy, which also impacts Political Rights.**

3. **Improve the Electoral Commission to be strongly non-partisan.**
4. **Ensure that any and all security forces stay out of political activities.**
5. **Implement measures that increase the visibility and role of women in government and the electoral process.**

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures country performance on the quality of the electoral process, political pluralism and participation, government corruption and transparency, and fair political treatment of ethnic groups.

Countries are rated on the following factors:

- free and fair executive and legislative elections; fair polling; honest tabulation of ballots;
- fair electoral laws; equal campaigning opportunities;
- the right to organize in different political parties and political groupings; the openness of the political system to the rise and fall of competing political parties and groupings;
- the existence of a significant opposition vote; the existence of a de facto opposition power, and a realistic possibility for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections;
- the participation of cultural, ethnic, religious, or other minority groups in political life;
- freedom from domination by the military, foreign powers, totalitarian parties, religious hierarchies, economic oligarchies, or any other powerful group in making personal political choices; and
- the openness, transparency, and accountability of the government to its constituents between elections; freedom from pervasive government corruption; government policies that reflect the will of the people.

Mathematical Formula of the Indicator

Freedom House experts use a scale of 40 points divided between three (03) subcategories:

A- Electoral Process (Three questions, 0-12 points)
B- Political Pluralism and Participation (Four Questions, 0-16 points)
C- Functioning of Government (three questions, 0-12 points)

Each question is given a score ranging from 0 (low) to 4 (high) points,

Calculation of the Current Score

2024
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores

Questions	Score (0-4)
Section A: Electoral Process	
A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?	2
A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?	2
A3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?	2
Section B: Political Pluralism and Participation	
B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	3
B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	2
B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	2
B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	2
Section C: Functioning of Government	
C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	2
C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	1
C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	1
Total Score	19

Calculation of Target Score

Questions	Current Score	Target Score
Section A: Electoral Process		
A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?	2	2

A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?	2	2
A3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?	2	3
Section B: Political Pluralism and Participation		
B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	3	3
B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	2	2
B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	2	2
B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	2	3
Section C: Functioning of Government		
C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government?	2	2
C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	1	2
C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	1	2
Total Score	19	23

Improving the capacity and fairness of the Electoral Commission (A3) is the most obvious reform that the Government can implement for this indicator.

Cote d'Ivoire's performance on corruption (C2), transparency (C3), and including various segments of the population in the political process (B4) seems deserving of a higher score than what Freedom House is scoring here – based on assessments on these issues by other rating agencies.

Below are the sub-components of the key survey questions. Areas for possible improvement are highlighted.

A. ELECTORAL PROCESS

A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections? (Current score: 2)
- Did independent, established, and reputable national and/or international election monitoring organizations judge the most recent election for head of government to have met democratic standards?
- Was the most recent election for head of government called in a timely manner, without undue, politically motivated delays or an accelerated schedule that unfairly limited campaign opportunities for some candidates?
- Was the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner?

- Were women allowed to register and run as candidates?
- Could all candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy fair or proportionate media access throughout the campaign, free of intimidation?
- Did voting take place by secret ballot?
- Were voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure or intimidation?
- Was the vote count transparent and timely, and were the official results reported honestly to the public?
- Could election monitors from independent groups and representing parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure its honesty?
- Did voters have equal access to polling places and opportunities to cast ballots?
- Has the most recently elected head of government been removed from office through violent, irregular, unconstitutional, or otherwise undemocratic means? (Note: Although a bloodless coup may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—particularly if it removes a head of government who was not freely and fairly elected—the new leader has not been freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.)
- Has the head of government's electorally mandated term expired or been extended without new elections?
- In cases where elections for regional, provincial, or state governors and/or other subnational executive officials differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does the conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights?

A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections? (Current score: 2)

- Did independent, established, and reputable domestic and/or international election monitoring organizations judge the most recent national legislative elections to have met democratic standards?
- Were the most recent legislative elections called in a timely manner, without undue, politically motivated delays or an accelerated schedule that unfairly limited campaign opportunities for some parties or candidates?
- Was the registration of voters and candidates conducted in an accurate, timely, transparent, and nondiscriminatory manner?
- Were women allowed to register and run as candidates?
- Could all candidates make speeches, hold public meetings, and enjoy fair or proportionate media access throughout the campaign, free of intimidation?
- Did voting take place by secret ballot?
- Were voters able to vote for the candidate or party of their choice without undue pressure or intimidation?
- Was the vote count transparent and timely, and were the official results reported honestly to the public?
- Could election monitors from independent groups and representing parties/candidates watch the counting of votes to ensure its honesty?
- Have members of the most recently elected national legislature been removed from office through violent, irregular, unconstitutional, or otherwise undemocratic means? (Note:

Although a bloodless coup may ultimately lead to a positive outcome—particularly if it removes a legislature that was not freely and fairly elected—an appointed postcoup legislative body has not been freely and fairly elected and cannot be treated as such.)

- Has the legislature's electorally mandated term expired or been extended without new elections?
- In cases where elections for subnational councils/parliaments differ significantly in conduct from national elections, does the conduct of the subnational elections reflect an opening toward improved political rights in the country, or, alternatively, a worsening of political rights?

A3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies? (Current score: 2)
Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because opposition members participated in the country's electoral commission.

- Is there a clear, detailed, and fair legislative framework for conducting elections? (Note: Changes to electoral laws should not be made immediately preceding an election if these changes infringe on the ability of voters, candidates, or parties to fulfill their roles in the election.)
- Does the composition of election commissions ensure their independence?
- Are election commissions or other election authorities free from government or other pressure and interference?
- Do adult citizens enjoy universal and equal suffrage?
- Is the drawing of election districts conducted in a fair and nonpartisan manner, as opposed to malapportionment or gerrymandering for personal or partisan advantage?
- Has the selection of a system for choosing legislative representatives (such as proportional versus majoritarian) been improperly manipulated to advance certain political interests or to influence the electoral results?
- Are procedures for changing the electoral framework at the constitutional level, including referendums, carried out fairly and transparently, with adequate opportunity for public debate and discussion?

B. POLITICAL PLURALISM AND PARTICIPATION

B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings? (Current score: 3)
Score Change: The score improved from 2 to 3 because parties that boycotted the 2020 presidential contest participated in the March parliamentary elections and because of the formation of a new party later in the year, increasing political pluralism.

- Do political parties encounter undue legal or practical obstacles in their efforts to form and operate, including onerous registration requirements, excessively large membership requirements, etc.?
- Do parties face discriminatory or onerous restrictions in holding meetings or rallies, accessing the media, or engaging in other peaceful activities?

- Are laws and regulations governing party financing fair and equitably enforced? Do they impose excessive obstacles to political and campaign activity, or give an effective advantage to certain parties?
- Are party members or leaders intimidated, harassed, arrested, imprisoned, or subjected to violent attacks as a result of their peaceful political activities?
- In systems dominated by political parties, can independent candidates register and operate freely?

B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections? (Current score: 2)
- Are various legal/administrative restrictions selectively applied to opposition parties to prevent them from increasing their support base or successfully competing in elections?
- Are there genuine opposition forces in positions of authority, such as in the national legislature or in subnational governments?
- Does intimidation, harassment, arrest, imprisonment, or violent attack as a result of peaceful political activities affect the ability of opposition party members or leaders to increase their support or gain power through elections?
- Is there a significant opposition vote?
- Did major opposition parties choose to boycott the most recent elections rather than participate in a flawed process?

B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means? (Current score: 2)
Score Change: The score improved from 1 to 2 because there were fewer instances of violence during the March elections than in past polls.

- Do entities that are external to the political system (the military, foreign powers, economic oligarchies, criminal organizations, armed militants, or any other powerful group) intimidate, harass, or attack voters or political figures in order to influence their political choices?
- Do such groups offer bribes or other incentives to voters or political figures in order to influence their political choices?
- Do entities within the political system, such as major parties and incumbent leaders, use extrapolitical means (corrupt patronage networks, control over land or employment, control over security forces, control over party militias, manipulation of state institutions or resources) to exert improper influence over the political choices of voters or political figures?
- Do traditional or religious leaders use extrapolitical means (control over communal land or resources, bribes or economic incentives, violence or intimidation) to exert improper influence over the political choices of voters or political figures?
- Do major private or public-sector employers directly or indirectly control the political choices of their workers?
- Do major private donors to political parties or causes use opaque or illegal methods to exert improper influence over voters or political figures?

- Does the formal structure of the political system give overriding authority to entities that are not accountable to voters (hereditary monarchs, religious hierarchies, unelected military or party officials, the sole legal party in one-party states), thus excluding the public from meaningful political participation?

B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, religious, gender, LGBT, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities? (Current score: 2)

- Do national political parties of various ideological persuasions address issues of specific concern to minority or other relevant groups?
- When other parties fail to address the interests of certain groups, are political parties that are focused on those groups—provided they espouse peaceful, democratic values—legally permitted and de facto allowed to operate?
- Does the government inhibit the participation of certain groups in national or subnational political life through laws and/or practical obstacles—for example, by limiting access to voter registration or failing to publish public documents in certain languages?
- Are the interests of women represented in political parties—for example, through party manifestos that address gender issues, gender equality policies within parties, and mechanisms to ensure women's full and equal participation in internal party elections and decision-making?
- Are there unusually excessive or discriminatory barriers to acquiring citizenship that effectively deny political rights to a majority or large portion of the native-born or legal permanent population, or is citizenship revoked to produce a similar result?

C. FUNCTIONING OF GOVERNMENT

C1. Do the freely elected head of government and national legislative representatives determine the policies of the government? (Current score: 2)

- Are the candidates who were elected freely and fairly duly installed in office, and were they able to form a functioning government within a reasonable period of time?
- Do other appointed or non–freely elected state actors interfere with or prevent freely elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions?
- Do nonstate actors, including criminal gangs and insurgent groups, interfere with or prevent elected representatives from adopting and implementing legislation and making meaningful policy decisions?
- Do the armed forces or other security services control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government policy and activities, including in countries that are nominally under civilian control?
- Do foreign governments control or enjoy a preponderant influence over government policy and activities by means including the presence of foreign military troops and the use of significant economic threats or sanctions? (Note: If a treaty was signed and ratified by a freely elected government, adherence to that treaty is typically not considered an improper external influence on policymaking, even if it limits a government's options in practice.)

- Is the freely elected government able to implement its decisions across the entire territory without interference from nonstate actors?
- Does the executive exhibit excessive dominance over the legislature?
- Has partisan polarization or obstructionism seriously impaired basic executive or legislative functions, such as approving a budget or filling important vacancies?

C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective? (Current score: 1)

- Has the government implemented effective anticorruption laws or programs to prevent, detect, and punish corruption among public officials, including conflicts of interest?
- Is the government free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, or other controls that increase opportunities for corruption?
- Are there independent and effective auditing and investigative bodies that function without impediment or political pressure or influence?
- Are allegations of corruption involving government officials thoroughly investigated and prosecuted without prejudice or political bias?
- Are allegations of corruption given extensive and substantive airing in the media?
- Do whistleblowers, anticorruption activists, investigators, and journalists enjoy legal protections that allow them to freely and safely report abuses?

C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency? (Current score: 1)

- Do citizens have the legal right and practical ability to obtain information about state operations and the means to petition government agencies for it?
- Does the government publish information online, in machine-readable formats, for free, and is this information accessible by default?
- Are civil society groups, interest groups, journalists, and other citizens given a fair and meaningful opportunity to comment on and influence pending policies or legislation?
- Are elected representatives accessible to their constituents?
- Is the budget-making process subject to meaningful legislative review and public scrutiny?
- Does the state ensure transparency and effective competition in the awarding of government contracts?
- Are the asset declarations of government officials open to public and media scrutiny and verification?

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

DATA:
> In January: Prepare an <u>objective and credible</u> memorandum of justification to transmit to Freedom House that documents positive activities during calendar year 2021, especially regarding corruption, transparency, civilian control of the government, and women in the economy.

In particular, resend the memo provided by JWI/McLean to justify a higher score on corruption, transparency, and inclusiveness and send to Freedom House to obtain 2-3 additional points. Also include the high score of women in the economy.

REFORMS:

1. C2: Corruption: (See Control of Corruption paper)
2. C3: Transparency: (See Control of Corruption paper)
3. A3: Electoral Commission: Greatly increase the independence and non-partisanship of the Electoral Commission.
4. B4: Women: Implement measures to increase the visibility and role of women in government and the electoral process.
5. C1: Armed Forces and Legislature:
   - Regain the point / score (deducted because of the previous mutinies) by demonstrating and documenting civilian control over the military.
   - Take additional measures to de-politicize the armed forces and ensure their full control under civilian authority.
   - Take measures to increase the independence of the legislature from the executive branch.
6. Legislative Elections: Make preparations early for free and fair legislative elections.

Control of Corruption	Priority: Moderate #8 out of 20

Responsible Official :
M. EPIPHANE ZORO BI BALLO Haute Autorité pour la Bonne Gouvernance (HABG)
M. JEAN SANSAN KAMBILE Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice et des Droits de l'Homme
Gal. VAGONDO DIOMANDE Ministre de l'Intérieur et de la Sécurité
Focal Point : DIAMOUTENE Oumar / Jean- Yves MELESS / Amoncou Fidel YAPI

Indicator Institutions:
Brookings WGI / WB

	Raw Score (-1.5 — 1.5)	MCC % (0 – 100)
CURRENT	0.09 MEDIAN = 0.00	63%
TARGET	0.30	70%

Country	Raw WGI FY25
Bhutan	1,531
Cape Verde	0,985
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	0,784
Samoa	0,727
Kiribati	0,412
São Tomé and Principe	0,360
Jordan	0,089
Vanuatu	-0,015
Ghana	-0,099
Solomon Islands	-0,135
Côte d'Ivoire	**-0,313**
Tunisia	-0,342
India	-0,366
Sri Lanka	-0,384
Viet Nam	-0,416
Morocco	-0,536
Philippines	-0,538
Papua New Guinea	-0,657
Eswatini	-0,735
Egypt, Arab Rep.	-0,748
Djibouti	-0,781
Uzbekistan	-0,808
Bolivia	-0,838
Honduras	-1,112
Bangladesh	-1,121
Lebanon	-1,227
Congo, Rep.	-1,345
Nicaragua	-1,388

BOTTOM LINE

The raw score shows that Cote d'Ivoire is not far from dropping below the median. Stronger efforts are needed to improve Control of Corruption. Passing the corruption indicator is mandatory for a new MCC Compact.

The Minister of Justice and the High Authority for Good Governance are critical players to improve conditions.

The Government and the judiciary continue to exhibit pervasive corruption. This weakness is prohibiting better performance against middle-income countries and attracting higher levels of foreign investment.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

Prepare a "Memorandum of Justification" to document recent actions to fight corruption. Send the memo the rating agencies of Freedom House, PRS, EIU, WMO, BTI and to local experts of WJP.

Implement more aggressive anti-corruption measures that have real teeth, including:
- **Audits of state own enterprises and ministries**
- **Public procurement**
- **Conflicts of interest**
- **Customs**
- **Financial disclosures among senior government officials**
- **Prosecution and sanctions**
- **Digilization of government processes**

Description of Indicator

This indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. It also measures the strength and effectiveness of a country's policy and institutional framework to prevent and combat corruption.

Countries are evaluated on the following factors:

- The prevalence of grand corruption and petty corruption at all levels of government;
- The effect of corruption on the "attractiveness" of a country as a place to do business;
- The frequency of "irregular payments" associated with import and export permits, public contracts, public utilities, tax assessments, and judicial decisions;
- Nepotism, cronyism and patronage in the civil service;
- The estimated cost of bribery as a share of a company's annual sales;
- The perceived involvement of elected officials, border officials, tax officials, judges, and magistrates in corruption;
- The strength and effectiveness of a government's anti-corruption laws, policies, and institutions;
- Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians;
- The extent to which:
  - processes are put in place for accountability and transparency in decision-making and disclosure of information at the local level;
  - government authorities monitor the prevalence of corruption and implement sanctions transparently;
  - conflict of interest and ethics rules for public servants are observed and enforced;
  - the income and asset declarations of public officials are subject to verification and open to public and media scrutiny;
  - senior government officials are immune from prosecution under the law for malfeasance;

- o the government provides victims of corruption with adequate mechanisms to pursue their rights;
- o the tax administrator implements effective internal audit systems to ensure the accountability of tax collection;
- o the executive budget-making process is comprehensive and transparent and subject to meaningful legislative review and scrutiny;
- o the government ensures transparency, open-bidding, and effective competition in the awarding of government contracts;
- o there are legal and functional protections for whistleblowers, anti-corruption activists, and investigators;
- o allegations of corruption at the national and local level are thoroughly investigated and prosecuted without prejudice;
- o government is free from excessive bureaucratic regulations, registration requirements, and/or other controls that increase opportunities for corruption;
- o citizens have a legal right to information about government operations and can obtain government documents at a nominal cost.

General Mathematical Formula of Indicator

Review the WGI database for sources, calculations, and sources:

Country data by source
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Reports
2. Go to Interactive Data access
3. Go to Country Data View

Weights by source
https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/Home/Documents
4. Go to the link on Step 3 of the WGI Aggregated Methodology

Abbreviations of data sources
Go to WGI data sources tab, scroll down to WGI data sources, click on summary table link

Surveys used
5. Go to WGI Aggregation Methodology
6. Go to Step 2, data files link

MCC Methodology

MCC Normalized Score = WGI Score - median score

For ease of interpretation, MCC has adjusted the median for each of the two scorecard income pools to zero for all of the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Country scores are calculated by taking the difference between actual scores and the median. For example, in FY24 the unadjusted median for the scorecard category of countries with a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita between $2,146 and $4,465 on Control of Corruption was -0.54 (note, in FY25, the GNI per

capita range for this scorecard category is $2,166 to $4,515). In order to set the median at zero, MCC simply adds 0.54 to each country's score (the same thing as subtracting a negative 0.54). Therefore, as an example, Algeria's FY24 Control of Corruption score, which was originally -0.64, was adjusted to -0.10.

The FY25 scores come from the 2024 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators dataset and largely reflect performance in calendar year 2023. Since the release of the 2006 update of the Worldwide Governance Indicators, the indicators are updated annually. Each year, the World Bank and Brookings Institution also make minor backward revisions to the historical data. Prior to 2006, the World Bank released data every two years (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 and 2004). With the 2006 release, the World Bank moved to an annual reporting cycle and provided additional historical data for 2003 and 2005.

Calculation of Current Score

WGI's overall raw score is -0.31 on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale …

… and an MCC score of 0.09 (63%) on the LMIC standard, which is passing.

Source	Source Name	2023 Weight	2017 score	2018 score	2019 score	2020 score	2021 score	2022 score	2023 score
WJP	World Justice Project	0.21	0.40	0.37	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
PRS	Political Risk Services International	0.14	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.42	0.42	0.42
EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit	0.20	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25
WMO	IHS Markit World Economic Service (S&P Global)	0.18	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.67	0.67	0.67
BTI	Bertlesmann Transformation Index	0.14	0.40	0.40	0.40	0.30	0.30	0.40	0.40
PIA	Policy and Institutional Assessment (WB)	0.14	0.40	0.40	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.60
IFD	IFAD	0.05	0.40	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.36	0.36	0.36
VDM	Varieties of Democracy Project	0.09	0.46	0.57	0.52	0.41	0.36	0.38	0.40
GCS	Global Competitiveness Report (WEF)	0.05	--	--	0.30	0.34	0.37	0.42	0.46
ADB	African Development Bank	0.05	0.47	0.47	0.47	0.57	0.63	0.63	0.67
AFR	Afrobarometer	0.02	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.69	0.62	0.62	0.64
GII	Global Integrity (Africa Integrity Indicators)	0.01	0.38	0.50	0.50	0.38	0.44	0.44	0.44
GWP	Gallop World Poll	0.02	0.39	0.39	0.33	0.50	0.35	0.36	0.37
GBC	Transparency Int'l	0.00	0.68	0.60	0.60	0.55	--	--	--
GCB	Global Corruption Barometer Survey	0.00	0.68	--	--	--	--	--	--
IPD	Institutional Profiles Database	--	0.17	0.17	0.17	--	--	--	--

WBS	World Bank Entreprise Surveys	0.03							0.65
WGI			-0.52	-0.50	-0.54	-0.53	-0.37	-0.35	-0.31
MCC			0.24	0.35	-0.01	-0.07	0.10	0.19	0.09
			LIC	LIC	LMIC	LMIC	LMIC	LMIC	LMIC
MCC %			82%	77%	46%	42%	58%	59%	63%

WJP sub-score used by WGI for the Control of Corruption

NOTE: WJP uses the inputs of local experts inside Cote d'Ivoire for its scores. It does not accept supporting information at its headquarters in Washington.

Sub-indicator	Score (0.00 – 1.00) Higher is better	Global Rank (out of 142)		WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Factor 2: Control of Corruption				
2.1 Government officials in the executive branch do not use public office for a private gain	0.34	#119	Factor 2: 0.35 #110	0.35
2.2 Government officials in the judicial branch do not use public office for a private gain	0.37	#117		
2.3 Government officials in the police and military do not use public office for private gain	0.43	#106		
2.4 Government officials in the legislative branch do not use public office for private gain	0.25	#90		

https://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/country/2024/C%C3%B4te%20d'Ivoire/Absence%20of%20Corruption/Cote%20d'Ivoire

PRS sub-score used by WGI for the Control of Corruption

PRS scores Cote d'Ivoire 2.5 out of 6.0
WGI rescaled score = 0.42

EIU sub-scores used by WGI for Control of Corruption

Sub-Indicator	Score (0-4) Lower is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Corruption among public officials	3	0.25

WMO score = 0.67

WMO / IHS Markit (Now S&P Global) is a paid commercial service, so we don't have the sub-scores, but WGI uses one of the WMO survey questions:
Corruption. The risk that individuals/companies will face bribery or other corrupt practices to carry out business, from securing major contracts to being allowed to import/export a small

product or obtain everyday paperwork. This threatens a company's ability to operate in a country or opens it up to legal or regulatory penalties and reputational damage.

BTI sub-scores used by WGI for Control of Corruption
Question Q15.3 Anti-Corruption Policy
BTI scores Cote d'Ivoire 4.0 out of 10.0
WGI rescaled score = 0.40

PIA sub-score used by WGI (only one sub-score used)

Sub-indicator	Score (1-6) Higher is better	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Transpar., Account. & Corrup.in Pub. Sec.	4	0.60

Calculation of Target Score

MCC Target Score of **0.30 (~70%)**
Requires a target WGI raw score of about **-0.09**
Similar to Ghana

WJP Target Sub-scores

Sub-indicator	Current Score (0.00– 1.00) (out of 142 countries)	WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	Target Score (0.00– 1.00) (out of 142)	Target WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Factor 2: Control of Corruption				
2.1 Government officials in the executive branch do not use public office for a private gain	0.34 (#119)		0.45 (#65)	
2.2 Government officials in the judicial branch do not use public office for a private gain	0.37 (#117)		0.45 (#90)	
2.3 Government officials in the police and military do not use public office for private gain	0.43 (#106)	0.35	0.50 (#90)	0.45
2.4 Government officials in the legislative branch do not use public office for private gain	0.25 (#90)		0.40 (#55)	

EIU sub-scores used by WGI for Control of Corruption

Sub-Indicator	Current Score (0-4) Lower is better	Current WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	TARGET Score (0-4) Lower is better	TARGET WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Corruption among public officials	3	0.25	2	0.50

Improve WMO from 0.67 to **0.75** (WGI re-scaled)

Improve BTI from 0.40 to **0.50** (WGI re-scaled)
BTI scores Cote d'Ivoire 5.0 out of 10.0
WGI rescaled score = 0.50

Improve PRS from 0.42 to **0.50** (WGI re-scaled)
PRS scores Cote d'Ivoire 3 out of 6.0
WGI rescaled score = 0.50

Improve PIA from 0.67 to **0.75** (WGI re-scaled)

Sub-indicator	Current Score (1-6) Higher is better	Current WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)	TARGET Score (1-6) Higher is better	TARGET WGI Re-scaled (0.00 – 1.00)
Transpar., Account. & Corrup.in Pub. Sec.	4	0.60	4.50	0.70

Target score compared to other countries:

	WGI Re-scaled from source						WGI (-2.5 to +2.5)	MCC
	WJP	PRS	EIU	WMO	BTI	PIA		
Current	0.35	0.42	0.25	0.67	0.40		-0.31	0.09 (63%)
Target	0.45	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.50		-0.08	0.35 (72%)
Ghana	0.39	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50		-0.099	0.30 (70%)
Cape Verde	--	--	0.75	0.83	0.70		0.985	1.38 (96%)

Compared to the current scores and to comparable to other countries a WGI score about -0.08 would be sufficient to move Cote d'Ivoire to safely passing.

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

1. **Data for Rating Agencies**: Prepare a "Memorandum of Justification" to document recent actions to fight corruption. Send the memo the rating agencies of Freedom House, PRS, EIU, WMO, BTI and to local experts of WJP. May update the memo already prepared by the Ministry of Good Governance.

2. **Policy Reform Actions**

Direct the Minister of Justice to be more aggressive against corruption.
Empower the HABG with more authority and resources to fight corruption.

- **Clean Up Government Transactions.** Improve oversight of government transactions. Corruption thrives under inadequate and ineffective internal controls such as data and

financial management, auditing, policy & processes, and personnel systems. Reforms to improve financial management and auditing agencies achieve greater impact than other public sector reforms to curb corruption.

A. **Government Projects**: Recent audits have proven valuable and should continue and be expanded. Large government expenditures for infrastructure, health, education, and especially the cocoa and oil sectors are major source of corruption. Robust audits (by independent, third parties) reveal gaps in spending, missing funds, and likely sources of diversions – which can lead to detection and sanction.

B. **Government Procurement**: Large government procurements of goods and services from the private sector is another common source of corruption. Corruption in procurement allows inefficient and incompetent companies to win contracts at excessive cost and poor performance. Actions to improve government procurement include:
   - Assign independent, third-party procurement monitors on contracts over a certain size.
   - Make it illegal for government officials to have commercial interests in companies that bid on government contracts. Bidders should be made to include the names of its officers and financial beneficiaries in the company.
   - Adopt the "Integrity Pacts" program from Transparency International for large public procurements to encourage clean contracting processes.
   - Use standard bidding and contract documents, such as FIDIC or those used by the World Bank.

C. **Conflict of Interest**. Adopt additional measures and stronger enforcement to reduce conflicts of interest among senior government officials. This especially includes issues related to government procurement, where officials may have financial, ownership, or relational interests in companies being awarded contracts, or being provided kickbacks for procurement outcomes in their ministry. Senior officials should not influence the award of procurements, which should be determined by technical merit and cost.

D. **Customs and Trade**: Enforcing anti-corruption measures in the trade and customs area should performed by experts outside the associated ministries to avoid a conflict of interest and cover-ups. Strategies and actions can be designed using sources such as:
   - OECD Integrity in customs: Taking stock of good practices
   - G20 High Level Principles on Countering Corruption in Customs
   - 10 principles of the WCO Revised Arusha Declaration on Integrity in Customs

E. **National budgets**: Poor oversight and control of the budget opens opportunities for graft and corruption, whereas transparency careful tracking of the budget expenditures prevents waste and misappropriation of resources while enabling citizens to hold their leaders accountable. "After-the-fact" audits of ministry spending

encourages officials to perform more effectively and produces the data to find areas of mismanagement and illegal activities.

- **Prosecution / sanction**. Weak anti-corruption policies and poor enforcement gives government officials a sense of impunity from the fear of prosecution or sanction from illicit activity. This sense of impunity will continue and corruption will remain pervasive until the Government arrests, prosecutes, convicts, and imprisons truly corrupt senior leaders. Any strategy without visible sanctions of corrupt individuals is not serious.

  Senior officials have heavy responsibilities when serving their country, and by doing so also have control of funding and influence. Maintaining a focus on high-level corruption signals a seriousness to fight corruption because it removes the sense of impunity by those in power. Further, detecting and sanctioning senior officials sends a strong message (that perpetrators will get caught) to lower levels and other parts of government.

- **Strengthen Asset Disclosures**. Asset declaration is a key instrument for promoting integrity among high-level officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative branches.
  - The original asset disclosure filings from a few years ago were not serious; they were not reviewed. (Filings without review are no better than no filings at all.)
  - The Ministry should create a new and robust asset disclosure form and process that is adminsstered across all branches of government, including the judiciary. The form and process should incorporate best practices from advanced Western economies. Perhaps for a lauch in mid-2024.
  - Conduct a professional, non-political review of all asset disclosures that are submitted (even if not made public); identify and investigate those that are suspicious, erroneous, or incomplete.

- **Streamlining Processes for Government Services**. Low level corruption is strongly felt by average citizens purchasing activities of the state, such as licenses, permits, registrations, certificates, etc. Numerous studies cite a high correlation between the incidence of petty corruption and the extent of bureaucratic red tape. Corrupt behavior is especially prevalent when civil servants experience low or irregular pay, which pressures them to supplement their income in "unofficial" ways. To reduce this type of corruption, the Government should:
  - Digitize as many services and processes as possible.
  - Identify and eliminate any needless red tape and bureaucratic layers while safeguarding the essential regulatory functions of the state.
  - Reduce the "touches" a civil servant has on transactions.
  - Ensure clear signage in payment areas so customers know the cost of services.
  - Rotate staff regularly in positions where corruption may occur.
  - Provide higher and more regular pay to the civil workforce.

- **Leveraging Technology**. Technology is crucial to fight corruption and a necessary improvement to compete against middle income countries – who are far ahead of Cote d'Ivoire. Technology tools remove opportunities for corruption and enables the collection of data that leads to detection and prosecution. It can support audits, accounting, procurement, customs, budgets, services, etc.

- Expanding web-based and kiosk-based interfaces for government services.
- Expanding cashless payment methods for government services via mobile money, credit and debit cards, bank wires, smart cards, etc.
- Implement digital records management in areas where corruption is common so data is recorded, complete, and easily retrievable for investigation, particularly for government projects, procurement, customs, and services.
- Start with procedures in the Ministry of Finance, such as filing and paying taxes.

For example, Chile uses technology to make its public procurement system one of the most transparent and effective in the world. ChileCompra is an internet-based, business public electronic system for purchasing and hiring. In 2012 alone, users completed 2.1 million purchases issuing invoices totaling US$9.1 billion.

- **Allowing and Enabling Watchdog Groups**. The public, watchdog groups, and the press are critical contributors to anti-corruption efforts and provide an important deterrent to those who believe that they can act with impunity. When authorities censor the media and civil society, corrupt politicians and officials are more embolden in their illicit activities because they have less to fear. To strengthen these external voices, the Government should enact and ensure proper implementation of:
  - A "Freedom of Information Act" on most government activities and records.
  - Stronger protections for watchdog organizations, the press, and civil society groups that press against corruption.
  - Stronger "whistleblower" protections for those who identify and speak out against corrupt practices from the inside.
  - Social media platforms that press against corrupt practices.

Immunization Rates

Priority: High #9 of 20

Minister of Responsibility:
M. PIERRE DIMBA Ministre de la Santé, de l'Hygiène Publique et de la Couverture Maladie Universelle
Primature

Focal Point : BROU Gbotto Raymond / Dosso Ali OUATTARA Djeneba

Indicator Institutions: **WHO/UNICEF**

	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(20 — 100) **74.5** MEDIAN = 85.0	(0 – 100) **19%**
TARGET	**87**	**53%**

Country	Raw score
Bhutan	99
Sri Lanka	99
Morocco	99
Uzbekistan	99
Bangladesh	97,5
Tunisia	96,5
Egypt, Arab Rep.	96
Jordan	95,5
Cape Verde	94
Ghana	92,5
India	92
Nicaragua	87
São Tomé and Principe	86
Samoa	85
Philippines	85
Eswatini	85
Kiribati	84,5
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	82,5
Solomon Islands	76
Honduras	75
Côte d'Ivoire	74,5
Djibouti	74
Viet Nam	73,5
Congo, Rep.	71,5
Vanuatu	71
Bolivia	67,5
Lebanon	64
Papua New Guinea	43,5

BOTTOM LINE

Côte d'Ivoire has consistently failed the Immunization indicator, with little tangible effort to improve. This failure in basic health care highlights a significant weakness compared to other Middle-Income countries.

Continued low immunization for years indicates that the current program for immunization is broken. Actions must remove financial and logistical barriers and create positive incentives for mothers to have their children vaccinated.

The Minister of Health must take personal responsibility to elevate performance and work directly with the WHO, both in Abidjan and Geneva.

ACTIONS

Approach: Improve implementation of the program and ease barriers to mothers.

Target: Surpass 87% vaccination rate for DTP3 and MVC1 (Measles).

URGENT

1. **December 16 - 30, 2024: Push strongly the Big Catch-Up program of Gavi (and USAID) to vaccinate 2 million children under-5.**

IMMEDIATE

2. *Improve <u>routine</u> vaccination*: Expand free, routine immunization to all children under 5 years of age (currently parents must pay for children over 2 years).

3. *Improve <u>routine</u> vaccinations*: Transition the MOH's Gratuite Ciblee (free child and maternal health care which includes immunization) into national health insurance (CMU).

4. *Improve <u>routine</u> vaccinations*: Create an exemption category for pregnant women, mothers, and children under 5 years for monthly premiums of CMU to ease financial barriers.

5. *Improve* routine *vaccinations*: Make strong push for "rescue" program for catch unvaccinated children who missed their scheduled vaccinations.

6. Ensure adequate budget financing for full vaccination, including on time ordering of vaccinations and supplies.

7. Establish a <u>*credible*</u> national survey on immunization.

8. Establish a robust data collection system to produce credible national statistics.

9. The High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) should implement a robust financial and operations audit of the vaccination program.

Long Term

10. Recruit, train and over time, professionalize Community Health Workers as key actors in primary health care service delivery in Côte d'Ivoire

Description of the Indicator

The Immunization Rate indicator measures a government's commitment to providing essential public health services and reducing child mortality.

Mathematical Formula of the Indicator

$$\frac{(DTP3+MCV1)}{2}$$

Data Collection

WHO/UNICEF uses national data submitted by the CI Ministry of Health. National data are supplemented by household or community surveys from other sources, such as WHO's Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI), USAID's Demographic Health Survey (DHS), the UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). Local, national, and regional staff are consulted to prevent bias in the data.

WHO (Geneva) derives a final score using three primary sources:
1) Reported country estimate (Ministry of Health)
2) Survey data (EPI, MICS, DHS)
3) Administrative coverage / data (private sector, NGO data)

If national data is within 10 points of WHO's derived score, WHO will publish the national score. If national data are more than 10 points different than WHO's derived score, it will reject the country data and publish the derived score.

WHO and UNICEF continue to reject CI's country data as non-credible. Also, they view national campaigns as a distraction to implementing a solid routine vaccination program. (Campaign vaccinations are considered those where blanket vaccinations are administered in response to an outbreak.)

WHO will count vaccinations administered under a "rescue" program to vaccinate children who are late to be immunized or drop-outs, i.e., children who have not received their first MCV and/or their third DPT. These vaccinations of older children must be documented, ideally with the WHO vaccination cards.

https://www.who.int/teams/immunization-vaccines-and-biologicals/immunization-analysis-and-insights/global-monitoring/immunization-coverage/who-unicef-estimates-of-national-immunization-coverage

CIV - DTP3

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Estimate	82	75	73	79	87	83	83	79	72	73	73	79
Estimate GoC	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Official	94	100	85	91	97	93	96	94	90	91	91	97
Administrative	94	100	85	91	97	93	96	94	90	91	91	97
Survey	82	*	*	NA	NA	83	NA	53	*	NA	NA	NA

The WHO and UNICEF estimates of national immunization coverage (wuenic) are based on data and information
that are of varying, and, in some instances, unknown quality. Beginning with the 2011 revision we describe
the grade of confidence (GoC) we have in these estimates. As there is no underlying probability model upon
which the estimates are based, we are unable to present classical measures of uncertainty, e.g., confidence
intervals. Moreover, we have chosen not to make subjective estimates of plausibility/certainty ranges around
the coverage. The GoC reflects the degree of empirical support upon which the estimates are based. It is
not a judgment of the quality of data reported by national authorities.

••• Estimate is supported by reported data [R+], coverage recalculated with an independent denominator
from the World Population Prospects: 2022 revision from the UN Population Division (D+), and at
least one supporting survey within 2 years [S+]. While well supported, the estimate still carries a risk
of being wrong.

•• Estimate is supported by at least one data source; [R+], [S+], or [D+]; and no data source, [R-], [D-], or
[S-], challenges the estimate.

• There are no directly supporting data; or data from at least one source; [R-], [D-], [S-]; challenge the estimate.

In all cases these estimates should be used with caution and should be assessed in light
of the objective for which they are being used.

Description:

2023: Reported data calibrated to 2020 levels. Estimate challenged by: D-R-

2022: Reported data calibrated to 2020 levels. Estimate of 73 percent changed from previous revision value of 76 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-

2021: Reported data calibrated to 2020 levels. Programme reports a four months vaccine stock-out. Estimate of 73 percent changed from previous revision value of 76 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-

2020: Estimate of 72 percent assigned by working group. Estimate informed by difference between reported administrative coverage for DTP1 and DTP3 applied to estimated DTP1 coverage. EPI Coverage Survey does not include DTP1 by card only thereby not allowing recall bias adjustment. Dropout is informed by administrative data, which is lower than that expected within documented evidence in home-based records identified by the survey. Enquête Démographique et de Santé, Côte d'Ivoire, 2021 card or history results of 54 percent modifed for recall bias to 59 percent based on 1st dose card or history coverage of 70 percent, 1st dose card only coverage of 59 percent and 3rd dose card only coverage of 50 percent. Estimate of 72 percent changed from previous revision value of 75 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-

2019: Reported data calibrated to 2017 and 2020 levels. Enquête Démographique et de Santé, Côte d'Ivoire, 2021 results ignored by working group. Survey results inconsistent for neighbouring annual birth cohorts.Enquête Démographique et de Santé, Côte d'Ivoire, 2021 card or history results of 70 percent, 1st dose card only coverage of 51 percent and 3rd dose card only coverage of 44 percent. Estimate of 79 percent changed from previous revision value of 81 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-S-

2018: Reported data calibrated to 2017 and 2020 levels. Estimate of 83 percent changed from previous revision value of 84 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-S-

2017: Estimate of 83 percent assigned by working group. Estimate based on survey results. Estimate challenged by: R-

2016: Reported data calibrated to 2014 and 2017 levels. Programme reports increasing vaccination sessions and other efforts to increase coverage levels and improve data quality. Estimate challenged by: R-S-

2015: Reported data calibrated to 2014 and 2017 levels. Drop-out observed in the reported data is inconsistent with that observed in the most recent survey, particularly among those with HBRs where coverage levels would be expected to be highest. Estimate challenged by: R-

2014: Survey evidence does not support reported data. Estimate based on survey results. Survey evidence of 73 percent based on 2 survey(s). Côte d'Ivoire Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2016 card or history results of 68 percent modifed for recall bias to 69 percent based on 1st dose card or history coverage of 82 percent, 1st dose card only coverage of 74 percent and 3rd dose card only coverage of 62 percent. Programme reports seven month stockout at national level. Survey results do not reflect a decline in coverage as might be expected. Government disagrees with WHO and UNICEF estimates. Programme reports

that the conduct of supplementary immunization activities for measles and meningitis A as well as enumeration activities during the second half of 2014 was a distraction for routine immunization service delivery. Estimate challenged by: R-

2013: Survey evidence does not support reported data. Estimate based on survey results. Survey evidence of 75 percent based on 2 survey(s). Republique de la Côte d'Ivoire Evaluation de la Campagne de Vaccination contre la Rougeole 2014 (Rapport Final) card or history results of 82 percent modifed for recall bias to 80 percent based on 1st dose card or history coverage of 89 percent, 1st dose card only coverage of 68 percent and 3rd dose card only coverage of 61 percent. Côte d'Ivoire Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2016 card or history results of 67 percent modifed for recall bias to 69 percent based on 1st dose card or history coverage of 76 percent, 1st dose card only coverage of 63 percent and 3rd dose card only coverage of 57 percent. National programme reports vaccinating 100 percent of children. The programme highlights the conduct of seven weeks of intensification activities that allowed the programme to reach additional children during 2013 compared to previous years. Survey evidence for the 2013 birth cohort challenges the reported coverage level. Estimate challenged by: D-R-

2012: Survey evidence does not support reported data. Estimate based on survey results. Survey evidence of 82 percent based on 1 survey(s). Reported coverage might reflect recovery activities following the vaccine shortage in 2011. Estimate challenged by: R-S-

CIV - MCV1

	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Estimate	74	69	59	67	73	70	74	71	63	65	62	70
Estimate GoC	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Official	85	85	71	80	88	86	92	92	86	88	85	93
Administrative	85	85	71	80	88	86	92	92	86	88	85	93
Survey	74	*	*	NA	NA	70	NA	65	*	NA	NA	NA

The WHO and UNICEF estimates of national immunization coverage (wuenic) are based on data and information that are of varying, and, in some instances, unknown quality. Beginning with the 2011 revision we describe the grade of confidence (GoC) we have in these estimates. As there is no underlying probability model upon which the estimates are based, we are unable to present classical measures of uncertainty, e.g., confidence intervals. Moreover, we have chosen not to make subjective estimates of plausibility/certainty ranges around the coverage. The GoC reflects the degree of empirical support upon which the estimates are based. It is not a judgment of the quality of data reported by national authorities.

••• Estimate is supported by reported data [R+], coverage recalculated with an independent denominator from the World Population Prospects: 2022 revision from the UN Population Division (D+), and at least one supporting survey within 2 years [S+]. While well supported, the estimate still carries a risk of being wrong.

•• Estimate is supported by at least one data source; [R+], [S+], or [D+]; and no data source, [R-], [D-], or [S-], challenges the estimate.

• There are no directly supporting data; or data from at least one source; [R-], [D-], [S-]; challenge the estimate.

In all cases these estimates should be used with caution and should be assessed in light of the objective for which they are being used.

Description:

2023: Reported data calibrated to 2020 levels. Estimate challenged by: D-R-
2022: Reported data calibrated to 2020 levels. Estimate of 62 percent changed from previous revision value of 65 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-
2021: Reported data calibrated to 2020 levels. Estimate of 65 percent changed from previous revision value of 68 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-
2020: Survey evidence does not support reported data. Estimate based on survey results. Survey evidence of 63 percent based on 2 survey(s). Estimate of 63 percent changed from previous revision value of 66 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-
2019: Reported data calibrated to 2017 and 2020 levels. Enquête Démographique et de Santé, Côte d'Ivoire, 2021 results ignored by working group. Survey results inconsistent for neighbouring annual birth cohorts. Estimate of 71 percent changed from previous revision value of 73 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-
2018: Reported data calibrated to 2017 and 2020 levels. Estimate of 74 percent changed from previous revision value of 75 percent. Estimate challenged by: D-R-S-
2017: Survey evidence does not support reported data. Estimate based on survey results. Survey evidence of 70 percent based on 1 survey(s). Estimate challenged by: D-R-
2016: Reported data calibrated to 2014 and 2017 levels. Programme reports increasing vaccination sessions and other efforts to increase coverage levels and improve data quality. Estimate challenged by: D-R-S-
2015: Reported data calibrated to 2014 and 2017 levels. Estimate challenged by: R-
2014: Survey evidence does not support reported data. Estimate based on survey results. Survey evidence of 59 percent based on 2 survey(s). Programme reports five month stockout at national level. Government disagrees with WHO and UNICEF estimate. Estimate is based on trend in reported data. Programme reports that the conduct of supplementary immunization activities for measles and meningitis A as well as enumeration activities during the second half of 2014 was a distraction for routine immunization service delivery. Estimate challenged by: R-S-
2013: Survey evidence does not support reported data. Estimate based on survey results. Survey evidence of 69 percent based on 2 survey(s). Programme reports three months stockout at national level. Estimate challenged by: R-
2012: Survey evidence does not support reported data. Estimate based on survey results. Survey evidence of 74 percent based on 1 survey(s). Reported coverage might reflect recovery activities following the vaccine shortage in 2011. Estimate challenged by: R-S-

https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/country-profiles/immunization/2024-country-profiles/immunization-2024-civ.pdf?sfvrsn=5c9b258b_3&download=true

Calculation of Current Score

WHO 2022 data

Vaccination	CI Country Estimate	WHO/Geneva Published Score	WHO Downgrade	Average Score (MCC)
DPT3 / Penta3	XX	79	-XX	70.5
Measles / MCV1	XX	70	-XX	

$$\frac{DPT3 + Measles}{2} \rightarrow \frac{79 + 70}{2} = 74.5\%$$

Calculation of Target Score

Ensure average rate over 87%.

DPT3= 87
MCV1= 87

$$\frac{(87 + 87)}{2} = 87\%$$

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

74

WHO has had several missions to Abidjan specifically on the issue of immunization rates. The Prime Minister should receive a full briefing from the Minister of Health as to why immunization rates continue to fail and not improve – especially since Cote d'Ivoire is now a Middle Income Country.

ACTIONS

Approach: Improve implementation of the program and ease barriers to mothers.

Target: Surpass 87% vaccination rate for DTP3 and MVC1 (Measles).

Work with USAID for technical assistance.

To accomplish these actions, the Minister of Health must be made personally responsible for passing the Immunization Rates indicator. He must engage WHO directly in country and in Geneva so a full understanding is obtained and credible plan design and implemented.

URGENT

1. December 16 - 30, 2024: Push strongly the Big Catch-Up program of Gavi (and USAID) to vaccinate 2 million children under-5.

IMMEDIATE

2. *Improve routine vaccination*: Expand free, routine immunization to all children under 5 years of age.

   o Currently, only children under 2 years of age receive free vaccinations. Parents of children aged 2 years and above must pay for vaccination at INHP health facilities. This is a significant geographic and economic barrier to vaccination

3. *Improve routine vaccinations*: Transition the MOH's Gratuite Ciblee (free child and maternal health care which includes immunization) into national health insurance (CMU).

4. *Improve routine vaccinations*: Create an exemption category for pregnant women, mothers, and children under 5 years for monthly premiums of CMU to ease financial barriers.

5. *Improve* routine *vaccinations*: Make strong push for "rescue" program for catch unvaccinated children who missed their scheduled vaccinations.

6. Ensure adequate budget financing for full vaccination, including on time ordering of vaccinations and supplies.

      o   Plan for and implement increased funding for immunizations to accommodate the phase out of Gavi funding in 2029 and to ensure there is no gap or failure in vaccinations.

7. Establish a *credible* national survey on immunization.

8. Establish a robust data collection system to produce credible national statistics.

9. The High Authority for Good Governance (HABG) should implement a robust financial and operations audit of the vaccination program.

<u>Long Term</u>

10. Recruit, train and over time, professionalize Community Health Workers as key actors in primary health care service delivery in Côte d'Ivoire

      o   Community health workers play a vital role in bringing critical primary health care services to be accessible to the population.
      o   Costing studies in Côte d'Ivoire demonstrate that effective community-based care could reduce: maternal mortality by 35 percent; newborn mortality by 43 percent and under-5 mortality by 54 percent by 2032 contributing to more than 113,000 lives saved.
      o   Community-based primary health care is the most cost-effective investment for achieving the 2030 universal health coverage goals.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="2">

Girls Lower Secondary Education Completion Rates

</td><td>

**Priority: High
#10 of 20**

</td></tr>
</table>

Minister of Responsibility:
MME MARIATOU KONE, Ministre de l'Education Nationale et de l'Alphabétisation
Primature
<u>Focal Point</u> : **MEITE Inza / KONE Raoul**

Institution: **UNESCO**

	Raw Score	**MCC %**
CURRENT	(20 — 110) **30.04** **MEDIAN = 85.4**	(0 – 100) **0%**
TARGET	**86.0**	**51%**

Country	Girl Edu Score
Uzbekistan	99,06
Samoa	98,81
Sri Lanka	97,38
Bolivia	95,53
Philippines	90,01
Viet Nam	89,6
Kiribati	88,68
Tunisia	85,5
India	85,31
Bangladesh	70,52
Ghana	64,75
Honduras	62,55
Eswatini	61,53
São Tomé and Principe	60,05
Papua New Guinea	50,18
Côte d'Ivoire	**30,04**
Bhutan	
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	
Cape Verde	
Jordan	
Vanuatu	
Morocco	
Egypt, Arab Rep.	
Solomon Islands	
Congo, Rep.	
Djibouti	
Lebanon	
Nicaragua	

BOTTOM LINE

Côte d'Ivoire has the lowest recorded score among all Lower Middle-Income countries. Like poor basic health scores, weak performance in education is a liability and reflects a poor reputation for a country among middle-income countries.

Côte d'Ivoire needs to improve this weakness through a large, long-term program with new resources from the government and support from international donors.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

- *Data*: Undertake a credible national survey to assess the actual number of children of school age and number of children enrolled. This may require updating national census data.
- *Data*: Coordinate with UNESCO/UIS on annual data collection January – March 2025.
- *Communications*: Initiate a major campaign to encourage girls' enrollment in both primary and secondary school. The campaign should seek to reinforce a culture of education for Ivorian youth.
- *Donor Funding*: Launch a major mobilization and engage strategy to obtain donor funding and technical assistance for the initiative.

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures a government's commitment to secondary education for girls in terms of access, enrollment, and completion. MCC uses this indicator for the LMIC category.

Methodology

Indicator Institution Methodology

The Girls' Lower Secondary Education Completion Rate indicator measures the percentage of girls in a particular age cohort that have completed lower secondary school within a few years of their expected graduate date. Lower secondary school is defined as a program typically designed to complete the development of basic skills and knowledge which began at the primary level. In many countries, the educational aim is to lay the foundation for lifelong learning and individual development. The programs at this level are usually on a subject-oriented pattern, requiring specialized teachers for each subject area. The end of this level often coincides with the end of compulsory education. For FY25, MCC will use the most recent UNESCO data from 2018 or later.

MCC Methodology

MCC draws upon data from UNESCO's Institute of Statistics as its exclusive source of data, using the most recent data point of the past six years. Specifically, MCC uses the indicator named "Completion rate, lower secondary education, female (%)" which is included in SDG 4.1.2. MCC uses the observed data instead of the modelled data. To receive an FY25 score, countries must have a UNESCO value on "Completion rate, lower secondary education, female (%)" from 2018 or later. MCC uses the most recent year available that is, MCC uses the most recent data from the past six years. If a country does not have UNESCO data at any point from 2018 or later, it does not receive an FY25 score. As better data become available, UNESCO makes backward revisions to its historical data. MCC uses the observed data not the modelled data from UNESCO.

The Girls' Lower Secondary Education Completion Rate indicator measures the percentage of a cohort of children or young people aged 3-5 years above the intended age for the last grade of each level of education who have completed that grade. The intended age for the last grade of

each level of education is the age at which pupils would enter the grade if they had started school at the official primary entrance age, had studied full-time and had progressed without repeating or skipping a grade. This data is gathered from population censuses and household surveys which collect data on the highest level of education or grade completed by children and young people in a household.

In FY24 MCC revised its methodology for this indicator shift from a focus on Girls' Secondary Education Enrollment to Girls' Lower Secondary Education Completion. As a result, the scores from FY24 or later are not comparable to scores from FY23 and earlier.

Data Collection
Sources:
https://education-estimates.org/completion/country/
https://education-estimates.org/completion/methods/
https://tcg.uis.unesco.org/data-resources/repository-education-indicators/
http://sdg4-data.uis.unesco.org/
http://data.uis.unesco.org/

Current Score (MCC Scorecard FY25)

Completion rate, lower secondary education, female (%) = 30,04

Girls' Lower Secondary Education Completion Rate =

(Enrolment in lower sec edu, female) – (Repeaters in Grade 4 of lower sec gen ed, female)
School age population, lower secondary education, female (number)

With the denominator defined as:
　　　School age population, lower secondary education, female (number) =
　　　Population official entrance age to secondary general education, female (number) x
　　　School duration (theorical duration + 3 to 5 years)

　　　Upper value (+3 years)
　　　Girls' Lower Secondary Education Completion Rate Indicator = (Enrolment in lower secondary education, female - Repeaters in Grade 4 of lower secondary general education, female) **/** School age population, lower secondary education, female (number) +3 years (7 years)

　　　Lower value (+5 years)
　　　Girls' Lower Secondary Education Completion Rate Indicator = (Enrolment in lower secondary education, female - Repeaters in Grade 4 of lower secondary general education, female) **/** School age population, lower secondary education, female (number) + 5 years (9 years)

http://data.uis.unesco.org/

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Enrolment in lower secondary education, female (number)	668677	747714	814098	894982	874317	1 114 160
Repeaters in Grade 4 of lower secondary general education, female (number)	36343	44896	44736	44967	58389	55 810
Population of the official entrance age to secondary general education, female (number)	317045	324582	332320	340823	349936	360 477
School age population, lower secondary education, female (number)	1218689	1249880	1280067	1312008	1344823	1 381 022
Theorical duration	*4*	*4*	*4*	*4*	*4*	*4*
School age population, lower secondary education, female (number) +3 years (7 years)	*2219315*	*2272074*	*2326240*	*2385761*	*2449552*	*2523339*
School age population, lower secondary education, female (number) +4 years (8 years)	*2536360*	*2596656*	*2658560*	*2726584*	*2799488*	*2883816*
School age population, lower secondary education, female (number) +5 years (9 years)	*2853405*	*2921238*	*2990880*	*3067407*	*3149424*	*3244293*

Girls' Lower Secondary Education Completion Rate Indicator	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
Upper	*0,2849*	*0,3093*	*0,3307*	*0,3563*	*0,3331*	*0,419*
	0,2493	*0,2707*	*0,2894*	*0,3118*	*0,2915*	*0,367*
Lower	*0,2216*	*0,2406*	*0,2572*	*0,2771*	*0,2591*	*0,326*

Calculation of Target Score

The target score should be at least **86.0% to be above the median**

To achieve this target, a major multi-year effort is required at all levels of education. The aim is not only to increase the enrolment of girls in lower secondary education, but also to reduce the number of repeaters and the number of girls of official school age to secondary education. The following table shows an example of how this goal can be achieved over the next three years (it can take more than three years)

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Enrolment in lower secondary education, female (number)	894982	874317	1 114 160	1184000	1269600	1225000

Repeaters in Grade 4 of lower secondary general education, female (number)	44967	58389	55 810	50000	42000	36000
Enrolment - Repeaters	850015	815928	1058350	1134000	1227600	1189000
Population of the official entrance age to secondary general education, female (number)	340823	349936	360 477	300000	220000	165000
School age population, lower secondary education, female (number)	1312008	1344823	1 381 022	1200000	960000	660000
Theorical duration	*4*	*4*	*4*	*4*	*4*	*4*
School age population, lower secondary education, female (number) +3 years (7 years)	*2385761*	*2449552*	*2523339*	*2100000*	*1680000*	*1201000*
School age population, lower secondary education, female (number) +5 years (9 years)	*3067407*	*3149424*	*2883816*	*2700000*	*1980000*	*1445000*

Girls' Lower Secondary Education Completion Rate Indicator	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Upper	*0,3563*	*0,3331*	*0,419*	*0,54*	*0,73*	*0,99*
Lower	*0,2771*	*0,2591*	*0,326*	*0,42*	*0,62*	*0,82*

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

Achieving this target score for girl's completion in secondary school will require a large-scale, multi-year initiative by the government, ideally an initiative by the President.

Direct the Minister of Education to:
- Complile proper country data:
    a. Obtain the sub-data (# girls completed and total # girls) used by UNESCO for its published numbers.
    b. Compare to current national data.
    c. Undertake a credible national survey to assess the actual number of children of school age and number of children enrolled and graduating. This may require a large-scale national census.
- Initiate a major communications campaign to increase girls enrollment in both primary and secondary school.
- Launch a major mobilization and engage strategy to obtain donor funding and technical assistance for the initiative.
- Closely coordinate with UNESCO/UIS Director on annual data collection January – March 2025.

Health Expenditures

Priority: High #11 of 20

Minister of Responsibility:
M. PIERRE DIMBA Ministre de la Santé, de l'Hygiène Publique et de la Couverture Maladie Universelle
M. ADAMA COULIBALY, Ministre des Finances et du Budget
M. MOUSSA SANOGO
Ministre du Patrimoine, du Portefeuille de l'Etat et des Entreprises Publiques
Primature
<u>**Focal Point :**</u> **OUATTARA Djeneba / BROU Gbotto Raymond / Sambro N'GUESSAN Eugene / Dosso Ali**

Indicator Institution(s): **WHO**

	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(0 — 10) **1.03** MEDIAN = 2.28	(0 – 100) **7%**
TARGET	**3.00**	**60%**

Country	Health Exp Score
Kiribati	8,49
Bolivia	5,89
Nicaragua	5,16
Samoa	5,02
Cabo Verde	4,28
São Tomé and Principe	4,12
Tunisia	3,94
Honduras	3,37
Solomon Islands	3,32
Eswatini	3,24
Uzbekistan	2,5
Jordan	2,49
Philippines	2,32
Morocco	2,32
Bhutan	2,15
Ghana	2,05
Viet Nam	2
Lebanon	1,96
Egypt	1,78
Sri Lanka	1,76
Vanuatu	1,67
Papua New Guinea	1,53
Cote d'Ivoire	**1,34**
India	1,29
Micronesia	1,12
Djibouti	1,03
Congo, Rep.	0,81
Bangladesh	0,15
Ukraine	

BOTTOM LINE

Health spending in Côte d'Ivoire (as a % of GDP), is less than half the average of other Lower Middle-Income countries and is falling further behind.

To improve its position, Cote d'Ivoire must increase health budgets faster than the rate greater than GDP growth AND faster than the increases being made by other countries. Data collection and reporting to WHO must also improve.

ACTIONS

Target: 3% GGHE/GDP spending level.

<u>**IMMEDIATE**</u>

1. **Direct the Ministry of Finance to create a strategic pathway to 3% GGHI-D spending within 2-4 years.**

2. **Conduct an adequate and credible accounting for the payment of national insurance premiums to be applied to the FS3 category of WHO data.**

3. **Obtain 2022 and 2023 GGHE-D data from the Ministry of Health and compare to WHO data, specifically the FS1 and FS3 data (and sub-data).**

<u>**Strategic**</u>

4. **Make a strategic shift in the Ministry of Health's budget toward community-based primary health care.**

   o **Currently, only 16 percent of health facility financing goes to the primary health care level (3,411 primary health care facilities) while 71 percent of health financing resources go towards the tertiary level (10 specialist and teaching hospitals).**

5. **Increase budgets to fill major gaps for essential medicines and commodities, especially for HIV treatment and laboratory commodities, due to insufficient and/or delayed disbursement of funding from GoCI.**

6. **Begin incremental increases in spending to accommodate the phase out of GAVI funding ending in 2029 to ensure no gaps in immunization results.**

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures a government's commitment to invest in health systems.

Mathematical Formula of the Indicator

General Government Health Expenditure - DOMESTIC as a percentage of GDP.

$$\frac{\textbf{GGHE-D}}{\textbf{GDP}}$$

Methodology

<u>Indicator Institution Methodology</u>

This indicator measures domestic general government health expenditure (GGHE-D) as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Domestic general government health expenditure includes outlays earmarked for health maintenance, restoration or enhancement of the health status of the population, paid for in cash or in kind by the following financing agents: central/federal, state/provincial/regional, and local/municipal authorities; extra-budgetary agencies, social security schemes; and parastatals. All are financed through domestic funds. GGHE-D includes only current expenditures made during the year (excluding investment expenditures such as capital transfers). The classification of the functions of government (COFOG) promoted by the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), OECD and other institutions sets the boundaries for public outlays. Figures are originally estimated in million national currency units (million NCU) and in current prices. GDP data are primarily drawn from the United Nations National Accounts statistics.

MCC Methodology
This indicator measures public expenditure on health as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP). MCC relies on the World Health Organization (WHO) for data on public health expenditure. The WHO estimates domestic general government health expenditure (GGHE-D) — the sum of current outlays by government entities to purchase health care services and goods — in million national currency units (million NCU) and in current prices. GDP data are primarily drawn from the United Nations National Accounts statistics.

Prior to FY19, MCC utilized a slightly different indicator, which was discontinued by the WHO. Because MCC started using a different indicator from the WHO in FY19, data from FY19 onward on MCC's scorecard are not comparable to data found on MCC scorecards prior to FY19.

The FY25 scores come from the 2024 update of the global health expenditure database and largely reflect performance in calendar year 2021. To ensure comparability, given the unprecedented nature of health spending in 2021, for FY25, MCC uses data from 2021 for all countries, even in the very few of cases where 2022 data is available.

Data Collection

WHO collects and updates national data during Q4 of each year for publication in Q1 of the following year. WHO updates its Health Expenditure database every two years, creating a lag of up to two-years on published data.

WHO prefers to use national data. However, when national data is not provided, it relies on data from the World Development Indicators (WDI). CI frequently fails to send data to WHO on health expenditures, so WDI data are used. CI's Central Bank/Statistical Office should provide the most recent numbers to IMF or UN Statistics Department.

Database
https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/domestic-general-government-health-expenditure-(gghe-d)-as-percentage-of-gross-domestic-product-(gdp)-(-)

https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/domestic-general-government-health-expenditure-(gghe-d)-as-percentage-of-gross-domestic-product-(gdp)-(-)

https://apps.who.int/nha/database/DocumentationCentre/Index/en
https://apps.who.int/nha/database/ViewData/Indicators/en

GHED methodology document

Calculation of Current Score (MCC Scorecard FY25)

World Bank records a 2021 figure of 1.03%
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.XPD.GHED.GD.ZS?locations=CI

The FY25 scores come from the 2024 update of the global health expenditure database and largely reflect performance in calendar year 2021. To ensure comparability, MCC uses data from 2021 for all countries on the FY2025 scorecard, even in the few of cases where 2022 data is available.

CIV score =   **1.34%**

GGHE-D: General Government Health Expenditures-Domestic
FS = Financing Scheme

Formula for GGHE-D as percent of GDP

$$\frac{FS1 + FS3}{GDP}$$

Funding Source	Amount (USD$ million)
FS1: Transfers from Government Domestic Revenue	**826**
FS1.1: Internal Transfers and Grants	803
FS1.2: Transfers on behalf of specific groups	22
FS1.3: Subsidies	0
FS1.4: Other transfers from government	0
FS3: Social Insurance Contributions	**137**
FS3.1: Social insurance contributions from employees	
FS3.2: Social insurance contributions from employers	
FS3.3: Social insurance contributions from self-employment	-
FS3.4: Other social insurance contributions	
Total	**963**

Source : https://apps.who.int/nha/database/Select/Indicators/en

The raw number for GGHE-D provided byWHO database is about **USD$ 963 million**

GGHE-D / GDP
Assume 2021 GDP is USD$71,81 billion (World Bank)
1.34% of USD$71,81 billion → USD$**963** million

So GGHE-D is likely about **USD$ 963 million**

The Cell and JWI/McLean need access to the country source data and the completed WHO
survey scorecards to better analyze the data and make recommendations for action.

Indicator Name	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
GDP (billions US$)	52,5	58,5	59,9	62,98	71,81	70,02

Indicator Name	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
GGHE-D (% of GDP)	0,95	0,91	0,99	1,37	1,59	1,34
GGHE-D (Estimation, million US$)	498	530	592	862	1158	963

MCC Scorecard	FY20	FY21	FY22	FY23	FY24	FY24
Health Exp Indicator	1.13	1.27	1.21	0.96 *(Median 2.46)*	1.37 *(Median 2.63)*	1.34 *(Median 2.28)*

**NOTE: The median among competitor countries continues to increased. Improvements by
Cote d'Ivoire must have a rate faster rate than both its own GDP and that of other
countries.**

Calculation of Target Score

Target score =   3.0%

For 2025

Assume a GDP of USD$70.02 billion (2022 data)
3.0% of USD$70.02 billion→ **USD$ 2.1 billion**

So the target GGHE-D is likely about **USD$ 2.1 billion**

ACTIONS

Target: 3% GGHE/GDP spending level.

7. Direct the Ministry of Finance to create a strategic pathway to 3% GGHI-D spending within 2-4 years.

8. Conduct an adequate and credible accounting for the payment of national insurance premiums to be applied to the FS3 category of WHO data.

   o WHO reports that data for the payment of national insurance premiums (FS3 category) is not being counted because the data is insufficient. A major boost to the score could be achieved if a credible and accurate database were created to report insurance data to WHO in a format that it will accept.

9. Obtain 2022 and 2023 GGHE-D data from the Ministry of Health and compare to WHO data, specifically the FS1 and FS3 data (and sub-data).

Strategic

10. Make a strategic shift in the Ministry of Health's budget toward community-based primary health care.

    o Community based health care would increase the access of primary services to 80 percent of the population.

    o Currently, only 16 percent of health facility financing goes to the primary health care level (3,411 primary health care facilities) while 71 percent of health financing resources go towards the tertiary level (10 specialist and teaching hospitals).

11. Increase budgets to fill major gaps for essential medicines and commodities, especially for HIV treatment and laboratory commodities, due to insufficient and/or delayed disbursement of funding from GoCI.

12. Begin incremental increases in spending to accommodate the phase out of GAVI funding ending in 2029 to ensure no gaps in immunization results.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="2">Child Health</th><th>Priority:
Moderate
#12 of 20</th></tr>
</table>

Child Health

Priority: Moderate #12 of 20

Minister of Responsibility:
M. PIERRE DIMBA Ministre de la Santé, de l'Hygiène Publique et de la Couverture Maladie Universelle
M. JACQUES ASSAHORÉ KONAN
Ministre de l'Environnement, du Développement Durable et de la Transition Écologique
Primature
Focal Point : OUATTARA Djeneba / BROU Gbotto Raymond / Dosso Ali / TONDOSSAMA Adama

Indicator Institutions:
CIESIN / YCELP

	Raw Score	MCC %
CURRENT	(20 — 100) **61.9** **MEDIAN = 89.6**	(0 – 100) **7%**
TARGET	**90.3**	**55%**

Country	Child Health Score
Samoa	98
Jordan	97,8
Egypt, Arab Rep.	97,6
Tunisia	97,5
Uzbekistan	97
Lebanon	96,2
Viet Nam	94,8
Sri Lanka	94,4
Honduras	92,4
Micronesia, Fed. Sts.	91,8
Bhutan	90,7
Philippines	90,6
Morocco	90,4
Cape Verde	90,2
India	88,9
Bolivia	85,6
Nicaragua	83,9
Bangladesh	83,6
Vanuatu	78,2
Djibouti	77,4
Eswatini	74,5
São Tomé and Principe	73,7
Kiribati	67,8
Ghana	67,4
Solomon Islands	66,3
Côte d'Ivoire	**61,9**
Congo, Rep.	60
Papua New Guinea	52,8

BOTTOM LINE

Côte d'Ivoire is far behind on the Child Health indicator, which highlights both real and reputational challenges for a country competing among middle-income countries.

Improving all three areas—access to sanitation, access to water, and reducing child mortality—will require a major, long-term effort with significant resources from the government and support from international donors.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS

Direct the Minister of Health and the Minister of Infrastructure to cooperate to:
- **Design a large-scale plan to achieve the target score, namely through expanding access to sanitation and water in rural areas.**
- **Identify and hire a credible outside consultant for technical design.**
- **Organize a mobilization and outreach strategy to obtain WASH funding and technical assistance from international donors.**

Description of the Indicator

This indicator measures a government's commitment to child health as measured by:
- Access to water
- Access to sanitation
- Child mortality

Methodology

Indicator Institution Methodology
This index is calculated as the average of three, equally weighted indicators:

1. *Access to Improved Sanitation*: Produced by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), this indicator measures the percentage of the population with access to facilities that hygienically separate human excreta from human, animal, and insect contact. Facilities such as sewers or septic tanks, pour-flush latrines and simple pit or ventilated improved pit latrines are assumed to be adequate, provided that they are not public and not shared with other households.

2. *Access to Improved Water*: Produced by WHO and UNICEF, this indicator measures the percentage of the population with access to at least 20 liters of water per person per day from an "improved" source (household connections, public standpipes, boreholes, protected dug wells, protected springs, and rainwater collection) within one kilometer of the user's dwelling and with collection times of no more than 30 minutes.

3. *Child Mortality* (Ages 1-4): Produced by the United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME), this indicator measures the probability of dying between ages 1 and 4.

NOTE: the definitions for sanitation, water, and child mortality are very specific as defined by the rating agencies.

The Child Health Index is calculated as follows.
- For Access to At Least Basic Sanitation and Access to At Least Basic Water, the proximity-to-target measure is equal to the reported percentage. For example, if a country has 84% of its population with access to adequate sanitation, it is considered to have a proximity-to-target score of 84.

- *Joint Monitoring Program (JMP) for Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene. Estimates on the use of water, sanitation and hygiene by country (2000-2022). World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). https://washdata.org/data.*

- For child mortality, the score measures the probability of dying in a given country to the highest observed probability of dying in each year. To calculate the child mortality proximity-to-target score, the formula includes a benchmark for the highest reported child mortality as a worst performance lower bound. Chad has the highest reported rate in 2010, of 70.8 per 1,000 in 2010, resulting in the following formula for calculation: 100 - ((country value) / 70.8) * 100). For example, a country whose children in the 1-5 age group have a probability of dying of 43.3 per 1000, therefore it would have a proximity-to-target score of 38.8 (or 100 - ((43.3/70.8) * 100)).

  - *Data on child mortality (the probability of dying between age 1 and 5 (4q1)) were obtained from: United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME), downloaded from http://www.childmortality.org*

MCC Methodology

CIESIN/YCELP's Child Health Score =

(0.33 x Child Mortality) + (0.33 x Access to Water) + (0.33 x Access to Sanitation)

In creating the index used for the FY25 data, Columbia University's Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) and the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP) relied on the most recent child mortality data ages 1-4 (4q1), water access data, and sanitation access data. If no updates from the most recent year were available, previous data were applied. Each of the three components (child mortality, access to water, and access to sanitation) is equally weighted (33.3%) in the overall index. Country scores are reported as 2023 data on the FY25 MCC Country Scorecards. As better data become available, CIESIN and YCELP make backward revisions to historical data. In FY20, CIESIN changed its source of Child Mortality data from the UN Population Division's World Population Prospects (WPP data) to the United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME data) since IGME updates its data more frequently than WPP. As such, some variation in Child Health data before FY20 could be attributed to the new underlying data source.

https://earthdata.nasa.gov/data/catalog/sedac-ciesin-sedac-nrmi-nrpchi23-2023.00

Calculation of the Current Score

Water and Sanitation are straight percentages so no normalizing is not necessary.
For Child Mortality (where lower is better), the formula for calculation is

$$100 - \frac{\text{(country value)}}{70.8} \times 100$$

2023 version
Access to Water: 73
Access to Sanitation: 37
https://washdata.org/data

Child mortality: 17,9 (raw) → 74,72 (normalized)

CME Info - Child Mortality Estimates

$$\frac{(73+37+74,72)}{3} = \textbf{61,6}$$

The data provided by JMP and UN IGME are up to date, but those of CIESIN/YCELP are not yet up to date

Calculation of Target Score

Target score: 90.3

All three sub-indicators are significantly below the median. Passing this indicator will require a major investment in water, sanitation, and child mortality.

Target Sub-scores
Water: **90.0**
Sanitation: **86.0**
Child mortality   **95.0**

Normalizing Child Mortality using a country value = **3.54 so**

$$100 - \frac{(country\ value)}{70.8} \times 100 = 95$$

$$100 * (1-Country\ value/70.8) = 95$$

So,
Country value = (1- 95/100)*70.8 = **3.54**

$$\frac{(90 + 85 + 95)}{3} = \textbf{90.3, which is passing}$$

Action Plan to Obtain Target Score

Achieving such a significant improvement will be a large-scale, multi-year effort with considerable resources from the government. Donors may provide funding (AFD, World Bank) and technical assistance (WHO and others).

A single senior point of contact needs to be designated to take charge and fixing this weakness.

Direct the Minister of Health and the Minister of Infrastructure to cooperate to:
- Design a large-scale plan to achieve the target score, namely through expanding access to sanitation and water in rural areas.
- Identify and hire a credible outside consultant for technical design.
- Organize a mobilization and outreach strategy to obtain funding and technical assistance from international donors.